Government policy on Afghanistan

Foreign Affairs Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 1 Sep 2021 Closed: 29 Jul 2022 Parliament page
International forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, 20 years after the US-led invasion. The Taliban quickly gained control of the country, taking Kabul on 15 August and triggering an immense effort to evacuate UK nationals and others eligible for protection. This inquiry will examine the FCDO’s role in the withdrawal, … Read more
5 Recommendations
14 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
9 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 25 events
25 Apr
2022
25 Apr
2022
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 8, Palace of Westminster
21 Mar
2022
21 Mar
2022
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · Room 15, Palace of Westminster
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
Foreign Affairs Committee
Sir Stephen Lovegrove · Ministry of Defence
Foreign Affairs Committee
Nigel Casey MVO · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Sir Philip Barton KCMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Foreign Affairs Committee
Admiral Sir Ben Key KCB CBE · Ministry of Defence Nigel Casey MVO · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP · Ministry of Defence The Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
Foreign Affairs Committee
Nigel Casey MVO · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Sir Laurie Bristow KCMG Sir Philip Barton KCMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Foreign Affairs Committee
Field Marshal the Lord Richards of Herstmonceux GCB CBE DSO DL Kori Schake · American Enterprise Institute Rt Hon Rory Stewart Rudra Chaudhuri · Carnegie India
Foreign Affairs Committee
General David Petraeus (ret.) Laurel Miller · US State Department Professor Michael Semple Shaharzad Akbar · Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Shukria Barakzai
Foreign Affairs Committee
Rt Hon Dominic Raab
Recommendations & Conclusions
19 results
1 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal...
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the Doha Agreement and the UK's attempts to shape the US approach. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul, and says those issues are covered elsewhere in the response.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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2 Conclusion Rejected
First report - Missing in action: …
Once the US decision was announced in February 2020, the UK Government should have immediately...
Once the US decision was announced in February 2020, the UK Government should have immediately taken steps to develop a clear and coherent policv on who it would prioritise for evacuation; to gather and securely store information on eligible locally- … Read more
Government Response
The government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul and refers to further sections.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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3 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with...
Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be … Read more
Government Response
The government recognizes the strength of the Committee's view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly. They state the issue was considered on a cross-Government basis but difficult choices were inescapable because its capacity to resettle people would inevitably vastly outstrip its capacity.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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4 Conclusion Not Addressed
First report - Missing in action: …
Managing a complex evacuation requires Government departments to work together seamlessly, including the FCDO, MOD,...
Managing a complex evacuation requires Government departments to work together seamlessly, including the FCDO, MOD, intelligence agencies, Home Office and Cabinet Office. The National Security Council is “the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security”. … Read more
Government Response
The response details the pace and intensity of cross-government work on Afghanistan, the meetings held, and the planning for Op PITTING and the Evacuation Handling Centre, but does not directly address the failure of the National Security Council to adequately coordinate cross-Government planning and preparation.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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5 Recommendation Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff...
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the need to keep accurate records on locally employed staff. They refer to other recommendations for their response on offering resettlement to local partners not directly employed and highlight that FCDO Travel Advice was strengthened.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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6 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave...
The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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7 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a...
The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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8 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short.
However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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9 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination.
The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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10 Conclusion Rejected
First report - Missing in action: …
The failure to plan for the Special Cases evacuations, or to put in place a...
The failure to plan for the Special Cases evacuations, or to put in place a fair and robust prioritisation system, left the process open to arbitrary political interventions. This is illustrated by the case of the Nowzad animal charity. Amid … Read more
Government Response
The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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11 Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: …
The FCDO has repeatedly given us answers that, in our judgement, are at best intentionally...
The FCDO has repeatedly given us answers that, in our judgement, are at best intentionally evasive, and often deliberately misleading. On Nowzad, they only admitted that the case had been in any way unusual when faced with the evidence of … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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12 Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: …
Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken...
Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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13 Conclusion
First report - Missing in action: …
The FCDO failed to take the basic administrative step of recording its decisions.
The FCDO failed to take the basic administrative step of recording its decisions. It is fundamental to any bureaucracy to know precisely what decisions have been made, by whom, with what authority, and when. This would be a serious failure … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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14 Recommendation Accepted
First report - Missing in action: …
The Taliban takeover is a tragedy for Afghanistan, marking the single biggest reversal in the...
The Taliban takeover is a tragedy for Afghanistan, marking the single biggest reversal in the rights of women and girls in a generation. We welcome the Government’s pragmatic engagement with the Taliban at official level: it is valid to withhold … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the need for pragmatic engagement in Afghanistan, has established a temporary UK Mission in Doha, and will ensure that women are part of UK official delegations meeting the Taliban wherever possible. The government will continue to coordinate with international partners.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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15 Recommendation Accepted
First report - Missing in action: …
It is important for the UK’s engagement with the Taliban to come alongside extensive and...
It is important for the UK’s engagement with the Taliban to come alongside extensive and targeted outreach to Afghan civil society, particularly those active on the ground. It should consult these groups on its policies towards Afghanistan and support them … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees on the importance of helping sustain Afghan civil society and states that FCDO Ministers and officials have continued to meet a range of civil society representatives. They agree that the FCDO should continue to invest in its expertise on Afghanistan and will prioritise projects related to monitoring and reducing human rights abuses.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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16 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country.
The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the impact of the humanitarian crisis, has delivered on its pledge to spend £286 million, and has committed the same amount again for the current financial year. They state that they are working with partners and have been a leading voice in encouraging the rapid repurposing of funds.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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17 Recommendation Accepted in Part
First report - Missing in action: …
The UK should try to mitigate the impact of the Taliban regime by thinking creatively...
The UK should try to mitigate the impact of the Taliban regime by thinking creatively about the provision of aid. For example, online classes accessible from home and alternative measures to help the most vulnerable Afghan citizens should be considered. … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the humanitarian crisis and has committed the same amount of aid as last year, worked with partners, and played a leading role in mobilising funds. They are exploring options for technical assistance but state the Afghan Finance Ministry and Central Bank Governor have rejected a proposed Humanitarian Exchange Facility.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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18 Recommendation Accepted in Part
First report - Missing in action: …
The halving of UK aid to Afghanistan in 2020/1 is an example of the harm...
The halving of UK aid to Afghanistan in 2020/1 is an example of the harm done by aid cuts that were designed to reduce spending at speed, rather than considering wider UK strategic interests. These cuts, made at a time … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the humanitarian crisis and has committed the same amount of aid as last year, worked with partners, and played a leading role in mobilising funds. They are exploring options for technical assistance but state the Afghan Finance Ministry and Central Bank Governor have rejected a proposed Humanitarian Exchange Facility.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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19 Conclusion Acknowledged
First report - Missing in action: …
The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally...
The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the … Read more
Government Response
The government states its commitment to Afghanistan and its people is enduring, and that its strategy will be grounded in its enduring national interests. The government agrees it should combine diplomacy, aid, and trade in its strategy for Afghanistan and will continue to engage international partners.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 16 of 5 classified

Total 5 recs + 14 conclusions
Correspondence 9 letters
22 Feb 2023 Correspondence from the Permanent Under-Secretary relating to the FCDO’s internal ‘Lessons Learned’ review from the Afghanistan crisis, dated 08/02/2023
Parliament page
24 May 2022 Correspondence from the Permanent Under-Secretary relating to the FCDO’s internal Afghanistan Crisis ‘Lessons Learned’ review, dated 09/03/2022
Parliament page
22 Apr 2022 Correspondence from the National Security Adviser relating to the evacuation of Nowzad staff from Afghanistan, dated 28/03/2022
Parliament page
2 Mar 2022 Correspondence with Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon following up on the FAC oral evidence session on 25 January 2022 relating to Afghanistan, dated 28/02/2022, 23/02/2022 and 07/02/2022
Parliament page
28 Jan 2022 To committee Letter from the Permanent Under-Secretary relating to Afghanistan, dated 27/01/2022
Parliament page
27 Jan 2022 Correspondence with the Permanent Under-Secretary following his appearance before the Committee on 7 December 2021, dated 17/01/2022 and 15/12/2021
Parliament page
24 Nov 2021 Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary relating to Chevening scholars from Afghanistan, dated 27/10/2021 and 12/11/2021
Parliament page
3 Nov 2021 Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary following up on the 1 September evidence session relating to Afghanistan, dated 27/10/2021 and 27/09/2021
Parliament page
21 Sep 2021 Correspondence from the Foreign Secretary following his appearance before the Committee on 1 September 2021, dated 15/09/2021
Parliament page