First report - Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan
Select Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee
HC 169
24 May 2022
Recommendations
5 results
5
Acknowledged
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff...
Recommendation
When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the need to keep accurate records on locally employed staff. They refer to other recommendations for their response on offering resettlement to local partners not directly employed and highlight that FCDO Travel Advice was strengthened.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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14
Accepted
Para 48
The Taliban takeover is a tragedy for Afghanistan, marking the single biggest reversal in the...
Recommendation
The Taliban takeover is a tragedy for Afghanistan, marking the single biggest reversal in the rights of women and girls in a generation. We welcome the Government’s pragmatic engagement with the Taliban at official level: it is valid to withhold …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees with the need for pragmatic engagement in Afghanistan, has established a temporary UK Mission in Doha, and will ensure that women are part of UK official delegations meeting the Taliban wherever possible. The government will continue to coordinate with international partners.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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15
Accepted
Para 49
It is important for the UK’s engagement with the Taliban to come alongside extensive and...
Recommendation
It is important for the UK’s engagement with the Taliban to come alongside extensive and targeted outreach to Afghan civil society, particularly those active on the ground. It should consult these groups on its policies towards Afghanistan and support them …
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Government Response Summary
The Government agrees on the importance of helping sustain Afghan civil society and states that FCDO Ministers and officials have continued to meet a range of civil society representatives. They agree that the FCDO should continue to invest in its expertise on Afghanistan and will prioritise projects related to monitoring and reducing human rights abuses.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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17
Accepted in Part
Para 56
The UK should try to mitigate the impact of the Taliban regime by thinking creatively...
Recommendation
The UK should try to mitigate the impact of the Taliban regime by thinking creatively about the provision of aid. For example, online classes accessible from home and alternative measures to help the most vulnerable Afghan citizens should be considered. …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the humanitarian crisis and has committed the same amount of aid as last year, worked with partners, and played a leading role in mobilising funds. They are exploring options for technical assistance but state the Afghan Finance Ministry and Central Bank Governor have rejected a proposed Humanitarian Exchange Facility.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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18
Accepted in Part
Para 57
The halving of UK aid to Afghanistan in 2020/1 is an example of the harm...
Recommendation
The halving of UK aid to Afghanistan in 2020/1 is an example of the harm done by aid cuts that were designed to reduce spending at speed, rather than considering wider UK strategic interests. These cuts, made at a time …
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Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the humanitarian crisis and has committed the same amount of aid as last year, worked with partners, and played a leading role in mobilising funds. They are exploring options for technical assistance but state the Afghan Finance Ministry and Central Bank Governor have rejected a proposed Humanitarian Exchange Facility.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Conclusions (14) Observations and findings — click to expand
1
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 12
The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many years to come. There were systemic failures of intelligence, diplomacy, …
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the Doha Agreement and the UK's attempts to shape the US approach. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul, and says those issues are covered elsewhere in the response.
2
Conclusion
Rejected
Once the US decision was announced in February 2020, the UK Government should have immediately taken steps to develop a clear and coherent policv on who it would prioritise for evacuation; to gather and securely store information on eligible locally- employed staff, including biometric data; and to build contacts with …
Government Response Summary
The government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul and refers to further sections.
3
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 14
Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be able to evacuate all—or even many—of these people. But it …
Government Response Summary
The government recognizes the strength of the Committee's view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly. They state the issue was considered on a cross-Government basis but difficult choices were inescapable because its capacity to resettle people would inevitably vastly outstrip its capacity.
4
Conclusion
Not Addressed
Para 15
Managing a complex evacuation requires Government departments to work together seamlessly, including the FCDO, MOD, intelligence agencies, Home Office and Cabinet Office. The National Security Council is “the main forum for collective discussion of the government’s objectives for national security”. It failed to adequately coordinate cross-Government planning and preparation for …
Government Response Summary
The response details the pace and intensity of cross-government work on Afghanistan, the meetings held, and the planning for Op PITTING and the Evacuation Handling Centre, but does not directly address the failure of the National Security Council to adequately coordinate cross-Government planning and preparation.
6
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 20
The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the department’s top civil servant did not return until the civilian …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
7
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 31
The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military and civilian personnel on the ground in Afghanistan during the …
Government Response Summary
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
8
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 32
However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A total failure to plan how to help Afghans at risk …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.
9
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 33
The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how key decisions were authorised. It is clearly unacceptable that neither …
Government Response Summary
The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.
10
Conclusion
Rejected
Para 37
The failure to plan for the Special Cases evacuations, or to put in place a fair and robust prioritisation system, left the process open to arbitrary political interventions. This is illustrated by the case of the Nowzad animal charity. Amid intense media attention, its staff were called for evacuation at …
Government Response Summary
The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul.
11
Conclusion
The FCDO has repeatedly given us answers that, in our judgement, are at best intentionally evasive, and often deliberately misleading. On Nowzad, they only admitted that the case had been in any way unusual when faced with the evidence of whistleblowers. At best, the Permanent Under-Secretary displayed a worrying lack …
12
Conclusion
Para 42
Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be confident that it is receiving honest answers to its questions. …
13
Conclusion
The FCDO failed to take the basic administrative step of recording its decisions. It is fundamental to any bureaucracy to know precisely what decisions have been made, by whom, with what authority, and when. This would be a serious failure at any time, but during the withdrawal from Afghanistan may …
16
Conclusion
Acknowledged
Para 55
The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid is vital, but will not be enough to avert catastrophe …
Government Response Summary
The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the impact of the humanitarian crisis, has delivered on its pledge to spend £286 million, and has committed the same amount again for the current financial year. They state that they are working with partners and have been a leading voice in encouraging the rapid repurposing of funds.
19
Conclusion
Acknowledged
The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the Taliban takeover have serious implications for British security and wider …
Government Response Summary
The government states its commitment to Afghanistan and its people is enduring, and that its strategy will be grounded in its enduring national interests. The government agrees it should combine diplomacy, aid, and trade in its strategy for Afghanistan and will continue to engage international partners.