First report - Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan

Select Committee

Foreign Affairs Committee HC 169 24 May 2022

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 19 items (8 recs)

Source View on Parliament website

Government Response (AI assessment · 19 of 19 classified)

Accepted 2

Accepted in Part 2

Acknowledged 10

Not Addressed 3

Rejected 2

Government response

Second Special Report - Missing in action: UK leadership and the withdrawal from Afghanistan: Government Response to the Committee’s First Report · published 29 Jul 2022

Read the government response ↗ Response on the tracker

Recommendations & Conclusions

10 results

1 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 12

The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal...

Conclusion

The manner of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan was a disaster, a betrayal of our allies, and weakens the trust that helps to keep British people safe. It will affect the UK’s international reputation and interests for many … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the Doha Agreement and the UK's attempts to shape the US approach. The Government does not agree that it failed to plan for a possible evacuation, or that the FCDO failed to plan for the possible closure of the British Embassy in Kabul, and says those issues are covered elsewhere in the response.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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3 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 14

Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with...

Conclusion

Most damning for the FCDO is the total absence of a plan—developed in conjunction with the Home Office—for evacuating Afghans who supported the UK mission, without being directly employed by the UK Government. The Government was never going to be … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government recognizes the strength of the Committee's view that the UK had a responsibility to Afghan nationals beyond those who had worked for HMG directly. They state the issue was considered on a cross-Government basis but difficult choices were inescapable because its capacity to resettle people would inevitably vastly outstrip its capacity.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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5 Recommendation Acknowledged

When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff...

Recommendation

When engaging in fragile environments, the Government should keep better records— securely held—on locally-employed staff to ensure that any evacuation can be carried out more effectively. It should devise a policy, based on clear and fair principles, about the assistance … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government agrees on the need to keep accurate records on locally employed staff. They refer to other recommendations for their response on offering resettlement to local partners not directly employed and highlight that FCDO Travel Advice was strengthened.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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6 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 20

The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave...

Conclusion

The absence of the FCDO’s top leadership—both ministerial and official—when Kabul fell is a grave indictment of the attitudes of the Government, representing a failure of leadership across the board in the Foreign Office. In particular, the fact that the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government agrees there are fundamental lessons to learn from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and accepts there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement. The FCDO is committed to implementing those lessons to raise standards in preparedness for and response to future crises.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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7 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 31

The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a...

Conclusion

The effort to evacuate UK and Afghan nationals after the fall of Kabul represented a heroic effort by the individuals involved, with many—both inside and outside Government—working under enormous pressure to save lives. We commend the bravery of the military … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Government agrees that there are fundamental lessons to learn and accepts that there were areas of its crisis response which need improvement, committing to raise standards and implement lessons learned.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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8 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 32

However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short.

Conclusion

However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A … Read more However, on the strategic and humanitarian level the evacuation fell disastrously short. Shortcomings in ARAP, the scheme to evacuate Afghans who had worked directly for the UK Government, left many waiting for a response until it was too late. A total failure to plan how to help Afghans at risk due to their work to promote British values without working directly for the Government—the “Special Cases”— left many in danger. Some will have not taken other options, as they remained with false hope of a rescue that would never come. The Foreign Office wasted time by exploring the options for such a scheme only after the Taliban takeover. The hasty effort to draw up a list of those eligible for evacuation was poorly devised, managed, and staffed. In the absence of criteria that allowed for meaningful prioritisation of cases, the scheme seemingly relied on MPs’ interventions as its primary measure of the vulnerability of those seeking extraction. Given MPs’ responsibility to represent constituents, not to triage needs, this was never going to be a reliable way to deliver the right outcome—but only to attempt to silence criticism. The department failed to perform the most basic crisis-management functions, such as rostering an adequate number of staff to key teams, despite the fact that this Committee raised similar issues around the FCDO’s response to the pandemic. Underlying operational problems— such as a failure to integrate FCO and DFID IT systems—further undermined the effort. Junior staff were left unsupported to deliver a poorly designed policy, making life-and-death decisions with little support or guidance, at a cost to their mental health. While a degree of chaos is to be expected in a crisis, the mismanagement of this category of evacuations was inexcusable. The chaos and lack of preparation was not the sole responsibility of the department. A lack of seriousness, application and coordination at a political level across Government fatally undermined the task in Show less

Government Response Summary

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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9 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 33

The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination.

Conclusion

The evacuation required clear decision-making, strong political leadership and tight coordination. We have seen little evidence of this. To the contrary, decision-making was so unclear that even senior officials such as the National Security Adviser could not be certain how … Read more

Government Response Summary

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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12 Recommendation Acknowledged

Para 42

Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken...

Recommendation

Without the intervention of whistleblowers, we would not be aware that this intervention had taken place at all, despite asking many questions on the topic. Parliament can only perform its role of holding Government to account if it can be … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government expresses regret about whistleblowers and highlights existing and updated policies for staff to raise concerns internally. However, it does not explicitly commit to carrying out a review of internal processes in light of whistleblower testimony or reporting conclusions back to the Committee as requested.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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16 Conclusion Acknowledged

Para 55

The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country.

Conclusion

The UK’s engagement in Afghanistan over the last two decades ties us to the country. The overriding goal of our policy towards Afghanistan should be to reduce the impact of the humanitarian disaster unleashed by the international withdrawal. Humanitarian aid … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government agrees on the importance of mitigating the impact of the humanitarian crisis, has delivered on its pledge to spend £286 million, and has committed the same amount again for the current financial year. They state that they are working with partners and have been a leading voice in encouraging the rapid repurposing of funds.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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19 Conclusion Acknowledged

The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally...

Conclusion

The chaos and failures of the withdrawal and evacuation make it even more important—and morally imperative—that the UK commits to a serious strategy leading to future engagement with Afghanistan, in cooperation with allies and regional states. The withdrawal and the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The government states its commitment to Afghanistan and its people is enduring, and that its strategy will be grounded in its enduring national interests. The government agrees it should combine diplomacy, aid, and trade in its strategy for Afghanistan and will continue to engage international partners.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

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