67th Report - NS&I’s transformation programme

Select Committee

Public Accounts Committee HC 1237 13 February 2026

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 29 items (7 recs)

Source View on Parliament website

Government Response (AI assessment · 29 of 29 classified)

Accepted 12

Acknowledged 16

Not Addressed 1

Government response

Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixty-seventh report from Session 2024-26 · published 7 Apr 2026

Read the government response ↗ Response on the tracker

Recommendations & Conclusions

16 results

1 Conclusion Acknowledged

Evidence gathered from NS&I and Treasury on the Business Transformation Programme.

Conclusion

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from National Savings & Investments (NS&I) and from HM Treasury (the Treasury) on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme.1

Government Response Summary

The government acknowledges the Committee's foundational conclusion and provides an update on NS&I's Business Transformation Programme, including plans for developing options for a revised Full Business Case by Q2 2026-27 and leadership changes to address operational failures.

HM Treasury

10 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I confident in delivery despite lack of plan, failing to justify programme approach.

Conclusion

Despite the lack of information on timetable and cost, NS&I claimed it was confident that it could find a way to deliver the Programme by 2028, by “deprioritising” some aspects of the Programme.22 When asked how it could be confident … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the lack of information on timetable and cost and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

11 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I questions evidence-based decisions and deflects blame for Programme failures.

Conclusion

When we asked if decisions were being taken based on evidence, NS&I said that “there is always a chance that assumptions are incorrect”.26 The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority had found that NS&I’s understanding of the alternative approaches had … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.

HM Treasury

12 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I leadership slow to act on advice, offering limited lessons from Programme issues.

Conclusion

The external organisations that have reviewed the programme told the NAO that NS&I was sometimes or often slow to act, or did not act at all, on advice.29 We asked whether NS&I’s leadership had learned from the issues with the … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about NS&I's slowness to act on advice and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

13 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's "good news" culture fosters over-optimism and hinders Programme progress assessment.

Conclusion

We asked the chief executive if he was creating a ‘good news’ culture, which the NAO has identified as a factor in why programmes resets may not work, and which can lead to a situation where decisions are not made … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about a 'good news' culture and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

14 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I internal review found slow, hierarchical decision-making and lack of transparency.

Conclusion

The Government Internal Audit Agency’s review of NS&I’s culture in December 2024, found that staff felt decision-making was slow and hierarchical, decision-making processes were not understood, and there was a lack of transparency within Programme processes.36 NS&I introduced a leadership … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.

HM Treasury

15 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I launched risky parallel transitions lacking understanding and management of programme risks.

Conclusion

In taking forward the Programme, NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel, with no understanding of the risks that this was exposing the organisation and its customers to. NS&I said it had identified supply chain … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Programme's procurements and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

16 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's core banking engine replacement and data migration pose significant risks

Conclusion

There are still many risks for the Programme to manage, for example the replacement of the ‘core banking engine’ is extremely high risk, but the main work has yet to start.41 NS&I agreed that when it replaced its banking engine, … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risks to the Programme and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

17 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's new Risk Management Framework remains inadequately embedded and reliant on external expertise

Conclusion

In 2025, NS&I implemented a new Risk Management Framework, but has not yet fully embedded the framework throughout its organisation.43 We wanted assurance that this framework is good enough to ensure that risks to customer data could be managed, and … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risk management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

18 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I faces significant recruitment challenges, relying heavily on consultants for technical skills

Conclusion

NS&I had most of its operations contracted out when starting the Programme, and it had limited capability to deliver a digital transformation.46 NS&I told us it has found it difficult to recruit the additional skills and capability the Programme needs. … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

19 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I admits significant skills gaps, particularly in systems integration, hindering programme delivery

Conclusion

We pushed NS&I to tell us if it now had the skills and capability it needed. NS&I acknowledged that it had needed to bring in more capability, including in systems integration and at senior levels.50 It also, eventually, recognised that … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

20 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's workforce plan lacks detail, with outdated cost estimates failing to reflect increased staffing

Conclusion

NS&I said it was now developing a plan for workforce management in a more structured way, but did not provide details.54 It had identified the need to transfer knowledge from consultants to permanent staff.55 Its recruitment 45 Q 63 46 … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about workforce management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

21 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's continued reliance on distressed supplier Atos necessitates improved contract management practices

Conclusion

NS&I will continue to rely on Atos, which suffered financial distress in 2024, until at least 2028. NS&I told us it now has a contract management framework to manage Atos and the contracts with new suppliers. NS&I will need to … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.

HM Treasury

22 Conclusion Acknowledged

Treasury's 'earned autonomy model' for NS&I means intervention only occurs after issues emerge

Conclusion

NS&I has its own accounting officer and its own Board, and is responsible for the Programme, while the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor in government and also has a role overseeing major programmes across government.64 The Treasury told us that it … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Treasury's oversight role and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

23 Conclusion Acknowledged

Treasury's intervention in NS&I's red-rated programme was significantly delayed despite early warnings

Conclusion

The NAO found that the Treasury has increased its scrutiny of the Programme since 2024, and had instigated changes to governance, including appointing new NEDs.66 The Treasury noted that it has now moved to a “quite interventionist” approach, but agreed … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the timing of increased scrutiny of the Programme and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury

24 Conclusion Acknowledged

NS&I's evolving governance structures lack clarity and substantive plans to prevent future issues

Conclusion

NS&I said its governance structures had evolved, and it would add more NEDs. It said these changes were improving delivery, but gave no substantive answer to how its governance would ensure problems did not happen again. It also acknowledged that … Read more

Government Response Summary

The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about governance structures and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.

HM Treasury