67th Report - NS&I’s transformation programme

Select Committee
Public Accounts Committee HC 1237 13 February 2026
Report Status Government responded
Conclusions & Recommendations 29 items (7 recs)
Source View on Parliament website
Government Response (AI assessment · 29 of 29 classified)
Accepted 12
Acknowledged 16
Not Addressed 1
Government response
Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Sixty-seventh report from Session 2024-26 · published 7 Apr 2026
Read the government response ↗ Response on the tracker

Recommendations & Conclusions

29 results
2 Recommendation Accepted
Seek positive attestation on NS&I implementing culture review recommendations and leadership learning lessons.
Recommendation
NS&I’s positive news culture has meant it has not learned lessons, which has affected its ability to deliver the programme. NS&I told us that that it promotes a “can do” attitude and culture; while this has benefits in encouraging commitment … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to presenting an initial plan for business-wide cultural change, addressing review findings, to the Board/Treasury in early Summer 2026 for implementation over 12-18 months. It also notes ongoing governance revisions to incorporate feedback and challenge.
HM Treasury
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3 Recommendation Accepted
Strengthen and embed NS&I's new risk management framework, reporting progress to the Committee.
Recommendation
It has taken NS&I far too long to develop a risk management framework, which has left the taxpayer exposed to unacceptable risks. NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel with no understanding of the risks … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees with both recommendations, committing to Mr Goldstone reviewing the application of the new risk management framework and NS&I writing to the Committee by June 2026 on its progress in implementing and embedding the framework.
HM Treasury
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4 Recommendation Accepted
Write to the Committee detailing resource management strategy, consultant use, and supplier contract management.
Recommendation
NS&I has failed to support the Programme with the skills and expertise it needs to deliver successfully. As an organisation with most of its operations contracted out to Atos, it is not surprising that NS&I had limited experience of digital … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and commits to NS&I setting out its resource management strategy, including consultant and supplier contract management, to the Committee within six months.
HM Treasury
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5 Recommendation Accepted
Amend NS&I's reporting to include additional metrics on Programme cost and progress.
Recommendation
NS&I’s governance structures still do not have the performance metrics and information needed to hold the Programme to account. It is difficult to establish the cost of the Programme from the information provided by NS&I. The Treasury told us that, … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating that NS&I has already implemented new monthly reporting metrics for delivery progress and spend, will complete a full spend audit by Q1 2026-27, and is working to enhance financial reporting across governance forums.
HM Treasury
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6 Recommendation Accepted
Report to Committee on Treasury's assessment of NS&I's plan, budget, and oversight lessons.
Recommendation
The programme had suffered several serious setbacks before the Treasury gave it the attention it deserved. While NS&I is responsible for the Programme, the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor department and, given its wider role in promoting good practice in managing … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government agrees, stating the Treasury will assess NS&I's integrated plan through a new Full Business Case via the Treasury Approval Panel process, requiring external assurance and considering David Goldstone's advice. It also highlights actions already taken, such as bolstered Board representation and engaged skilled support, as examples of lessons learned from oversight.
HM Treasury
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1 Conclusion Acknowledged
Evidence gathered from NS&I and Treasury on the Business Transformation Programme.
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from National Savings & Investments (NS&I) and from HM Treasury (the Treasury) on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme.1
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the Committee's foundational conclusion and provides an update on NS&I's Business Transformation Programme, including plans for developing options for a revised Full Business Case by Q2 2026-27 and leadership changes to address operational failures.
HM Treasury
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7 Conclusion Not Addressed
NS&I attempted an overly complex, risky programme with too many parallel transitions.
Conclusion
We asked NS&I why it had been trying to do such a complex Programme, splitting operations undertaken by a single supplier into a multi-supplier model, in such a risky way. The NAO report shows that NS&I original planned expected four … Read more
Government Response Summary
The government's response completely fails to address the committee's conclusion about NS&I's complex programme transition and the need for re-evaluation, instead discussing unrelated matters concerning Carer's Allowance overpayments and reassessments.
HM Treasury
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8 Recommendation Accepted
NS&I still lacks an agreed integrated plan, facing further programme delays.
Recommendation
In December 2025, after five years, NS&I still has no agreed and approved integrated plan to indicate a Programme end date and milestones. NS&I has repeatedly failed to deliver such a plan.12 At our session in December 2025, NS&I said … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury accepts the recommendation, confirming that NS&I is now working to an agreed and approved integrated Programme plan, with detailed Cost Management, Programme, and Benefits Realisation plans approved in March 2024. These plans define scope, costs, and ensure delivery against milestones, with ongoing monthly monitoring and quarterly reviews.
HM Treasury
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9 Conclusion Accepted
NS&I unable to provide updated Programme costs, expecting to exceed available budget.
Conclusion
In the absence of a complete and approved integrated plan, NS&I was unable to provide us with an updated estimate of Programme costs. It had spent £111 million on the Programme by March 2024, but could not give us a … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury confirms that NS&I is now working to an agreed and approved integrated Programme plan, with detailed Cost Management and Benefits Realisation plans approved in March 2024, defining scope and costs. NS&I has also significantly improved financial data quality with robust controls and is developing a new, comprehensive cost reporting approach.
HM Treasury
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10 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I confident in delivery despite lack of plan, failing to justify programme approach.
Conclusion
Despite the lack of information on timetable and cost, NS&I claimed it was confident that it could find a way to deliver the Programme by 2028, by “deprioritising” some aspects of the Programme.22 When asked how it could be confident … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the lack of information on timetable and cost and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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11 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I questions evidence-based decisions and deflects blame for Programme failures.
Conclusion
When we asked if decisions were being taken based on evidence, NS&I said that “there is always a chance that assumptions are incorrect”.26 The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority had found that NS&I’s understanding of the alternative approaches had … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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12 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I leadership slow to act on advice, offering limited lessons from Programme issues.
Conclusion
The external organisations that have reviewed the programme told the NAO that NS&I was sometimes or often slow to act, or did not act at all, on advice.29 We asked whether NS&I’s leadership had learned from the issues with the … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about NS&I's slowness to act on advice and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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13 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's "good news" culture fosters over-optimism and hinders Programme progress assessment.
Conclusion
We asked the chief executive if he was creating a ‘good news’ culture, which the NAO has identified as a factor in why programmes resets may not work, and which can lead to a situation where decisions are not made … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about a 'good news' culture and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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14 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I internal review found slow, hierarchical decision-making and lack of transparency.
Conclusion
The Government Internal Audit Agency’s review of NS&I’s culture in December 2024, found that staff felt decision-making was slow and hierarchical, decision-making processes were not understood, and there was a lack of transparency within Programme processes.36 NS&I introduced a leadership … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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15 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I launched risky parallel transitions lacking understanding and management of programme risks.
Conclusion
In taking forward the Programme, NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel, with no understanding of the risks that this was exposing the organisation and its customers to. NS&I said it had identified supply chain … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Programme's procurements and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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16 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's core banking engine replacement and data migration pose significant risks
Conclusion
There are still many risks for the Programme to manage, for example the replacement of the ‘core banking engine’ is extremely high risk, but the main work has yet to start.41 NS&I agreed that when it replaced its banking engine, … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risks to the Programme and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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17 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's new Risk Management Framework remains inadequately embedded and reliant on external expertise
Conclusion
In 2025, NS&I implemented a new Risk Management Framework, but has not yet fully embedded the framework throughout its organisation.43 We wanted assurance that this framework is good enough to ensure that risks to customer data could be managed, and … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risk management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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18 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I faces significant recruitment challenges, relying heavily on consultants for technical skills
Conclusion
NS&I had most of its operations contracted out when starting the Programme, and it had limited capability to deliver a digital transformation.46 NS&I told us it has found it difficult to recruit the additional skills and capability the Programme needs. … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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19 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I admits significant skills gaps, particularly in systems integration, hindering programme delivery
Conclusion
We pushed NS&I to tell us if it now had the skills and capability it needed. NS&I acknowledged that it had needed to bring in more capability, including in systems integration and at senior levels.50 It also, eventually, recognised that … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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20 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's workforce plan lacks detail, with outdated cost estimates failing to reflect increased staffing
Conclusion
NS&I said it was now developing a plan for workforce management in a more structured way, but did not provide details.54 It had identified the need to transfer knowledge from consultants to permanent staff.55 Its recruitment 45 Q 63 46 … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about workforce management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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21 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's continued reliance on distressed supplier Atos necessitates improved contract management practices
Conclusion
NS&I will continue to rely on Atos, which suffered financial distress in 2024, until at least 2028. NS&I told us it now has a contract management framework to manage Atos and the contracts with new suppliers. NS&I will need to … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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22 Conclusion Acknowledged
Treasury's 'earned autonomy model' for NS&I means intervention only occurs after issues emerge
Conclusion
NS&I has its own accounting officer and its own Board, and is responsible for the Programme, while the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor in government and also has a role overseeing major programmes across government.64 The Treasury told us that it … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Treasury's oversight role and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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23 Conclusion Acknowledged
Treasury's intervention in NS&I's red-rated programme was significantly delayed despite early warnings
Conclusion
The NAO found that the Treasury has increased its scrutiny of the Programme since 2024, and had instigated changes to governance, including appointing new NEDs.66 The Treasury noted that it has now moved to a “quite interventionist” approach, but agreed … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the timing of increased scrutiny of the Programme and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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24 Conclusion Acknowledged
NS&I's evolving governance structures lack clarity and substantive plans to prevent future issues
Conclusion
NS&I said its governance structures had evolved, and it would add more NEDs. It said these changes were improving delivery, but gave no substantive answer to how its governance would ensure problems did not happen again. It also acknowledged that … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about governance structures and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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25 Conclusion Accepted
NS&I's programme cost data remains unclear, with financial controls rated only 'moderate
Conclusion
The NAO reported that it was challenging to establish the cost of the Programme from the information NS&I provided. NS&I said it was working on improvements to its cost data for its next business case this.72 The Treasury said it … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury notes the challenges in establishing programme costs, confirming NS&I's Cost Management and Benefits Realisation plans were completed and approved in March 2024, which define scope and costs. The response states NS&I has significantly improved financial data quality, implemented robust financial controls, and is developing a new, comprehensive approach to cost reporting.
HM Treasury
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26 Conclusion Accepted
NS&I's lack of transparency hinders Treasury's understanding of programme cost increases
Conclusion
The Treasury told us that the lack of transparency from NS&I had made it difficult for the Treasury to understand the reasons for the cost increases, saying it was not always clear whether the funding NS&I received was being used … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury acknowledges historic challenges in understanding cost increases but highlights that NS&I's Cost Management and Benefits Realisation plans were completed and approved in March 2024, providing clear definitions of scope and costs. The response confirms significant improvements in financial data quality, robust controls, and continuous scrutiny to track and manage programme costs.
HM Treasury
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27 Recommendation Accepted
NS&I's corporate metrics inadequately measure programme progress despite significant business risks
Recommendation
NS&I’s annual report and accounts state that it is meeting its overarching corporate metrics, including the important measure of how much finance it raises for government. There are risks to NS&I’s whole business and to its customers if the Programme … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury accepts the recommendation, stating NS&I now tracks programme progress through internal metrics reported to committees and the Treasury, and has adopted revised objectives aligned with the latest plan. These new targets are incorporated into the 2024-25 Corporate Plan, with performance to be publicly reported in NS&I’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2024-25.
HM Treasury
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28 Conclusion Accepted
Treasury lacked clarity on NS&I programme spending between business case approvals
Conclusion
The Treasury had applied its usual scrutiny to the Programme’s Outline Business Case in 2020 and Full Business Case in 2023, approving each subject to conditions.80 The Treasury said it had been satisfied by the spend data in the business … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury notes the challenges in establishing spend data for the Programme and confirms that NS&I's Cost Management and Benefits Realisation plans, defining scope and costs, were completed and approved in March 2024. The response highlights significant improvements in financial data quality and robust financial controls, with continuous scrutiny and reporting enhancements.
HM Treasury
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29 Conclusion Accepted
Programme budget fixed prematurely, requiring NS&I to develop plan within existing financial constraints
Conclusion
The Treasury said its spending review controls require the lead NED on the transformation committee to assure Ministers that the finances of the programme are under control.84, and it now seeks quarterly affirmation from NS&I NEDs on progress before releasing … Read more
Government Response Summary
The Treasury confirms that processes for Lead NED assurance on programme finances have been strengthened, and NS&I's Cost Management and Benefits Realisation plans were approved in March 2024. It continues to scrutinise monthly spend and holds quarterly assurance meetings to manage programme costs effectively.
HM Treasury
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