The Security of 5G

Defence Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 6 Mar 2020 Closed: 9 Jul 2021 Parliament page
The UK Government wants to be a global leader in 5G and the rollout has already begun in many areas. However, there are concerns about the security of 5G, including the use of equipment in networks supplied by foreign companies. This inquiry looks at these security issues. The Government announced … Read more
16 Recommendations
14 Conclusions
1 Report
3 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 6 events
16 Dec
2020
Report published
8 Oct
2020
Report published
22 Sep
2020
Formal meeting (private meeting) · Room 13, Palace of Westminster
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
6 May
2020
Correspondence
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Second Report - The Security of 5G HC 201 8 Oct 2020 30 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
12 results
Clear
4 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of...
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's observation that it has balanced technical and geopolitical considerations when formulating its 5G policy, stating its approach was evidence-based and informed by comprehensive security assessments.
Ministry of Defence
View details
7 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified.
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's findings on Huawei's risks, stating that its unique insight and technical analysis have informed its risk mitigation position. It adds that it will continue working with alternative vendors like Nokia and Ericsson.
Ministry of Defence
View details
9 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was...
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's confidence in GCHQ and NCSC, stating it appreciates the recognition and has carefully risk-managed Huawei's presence since 2003 through robust oversight mechanisms like HCSEC.
Ministry of Defence
View details
11 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in...
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable … Read more
Government Response
The government welcomes the committee’s conclusions and recognition of its response to the changed context, confirming that US sanctions altered the risk associated with Huawei's presence, making an updated government position necessary.
Ministry of Defence
View details
13 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share...
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms that the UK's most sensitive information is protected independently of public networks, and GCHQ has categorically confirmed that high-risk vendor decisions do not affect intelligence sharing. It also notes that equipment from high-risk vendors is banned near particularly sensitive sites.
Ministry of Defence
View details
14 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such...
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms the robustness of the Five Eyes relationship and its ongoing cooperation with allies, stating that while approaches may differ, the partnership is strong. It indicates that decisive action was taken based on UK circumstances and expert analysis.
Ministry of Defence
View details
15 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the...
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the … Read more
Government Response
The government emphasizes the special and enduring relationship with the US, stating it has been in close touch on telecoms security and continues to work closely to increase global standards and promote diversification.
Ministry of Defence
View details
16 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from...
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of working closely with allies and sharing experiences to raise cyber security standards, stating it is already doing so and will continue to engage. It does not explicitly address the recommendation to have considered alliance damage earlier.
Ministry of Defence
View details
17 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese...
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need to protect national security while remaining open to investment, stating that risks associated with Huawei have been carefully managed through detailed formal oversight by HCSEC since 2010.
Ministry of Defence
View details
18 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and...
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese … Read more
Government Response
The government states that decisions are made to satisfy robust legal, regulatory, and national security requirements, highlighting the new National Security Investment Bill as an important addition to existing tools for ensuring evidence-based risk assessment.
Ministry of Defence
View details
21 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique,...
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of working with allies on network security and industrial capacity, stating it will continue to work closely and internationally to address challenges and forge consensus on standards. However, it does not commit to specifically setting out the role of a D10 alliance or quickly formulating joint 5G policy.
Ministry of Defence
View details
22 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide...
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of liberal democracies working together and states it will consider how to best advance this through current or new groupings, without committing to a specific D10 alliance.
Ministry of Defence
View details
Government Response AI assessment · 30 of 16 classified
Accepted 14
Accepted in Part 2
Acknowledged 12
Deferred 1
Rejected 1
Total 16 recs + 14 conclusions
Correspondence 3 letters
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chair to the Secretary of State for Defence in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 3 June 2020, from the Secretary of State for Defence to the Chair in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
6 May 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chairman to the Defence Secretary in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page