Baha Mousa Inquiry

The MoD should give careful consideration as to whether referring to the five techniques as being prohibited 'as an aid to interrogation' remains the most effective means of communicating the prohibited techniques. Hooding prisoners is prohibited in all circumstances. It is not permissible to deprive prisoners of food and drink at all. Stress positions properly defined should never be used.

Five principles on permitted sight deprivation should be consistently emphasised in JDP 1-10 and subordinate doctrine and instructions: (1) where practicable the need to deprive CPErS of their sight should be avoided in the first place; (2) there must be a genuine sensitivity about the facilities or equipment before sight deprivation can be justified; (3) sight deprivation must only be for as long as is strictly necessary; (4) sight deprivation should not become routine; (5) when sight deprivation is used, it should be noted in a record.

JDP 1-10 should make clear that it is prohibited deliberately to keep prisoners awake, even for short periods, merely because they may shortly face tactical questioning or interrogation. CPErS may nevertheless be woken up in order to be tactically questioned or interrogated if the questioning is ready to take place, provided that the policy on minimum periods of rest is respected.

JDP 1-10 should include a simple checklist for actions on a death in custody. Where there is a death in custody, particularly one that is sudden or unexplained, prompt checks must be made on the welfare of other CPErS. The MoD should consider including guidance that where practicable the scene of the death should be preserved pending the arrival of the Royal Military Police.

JDP 1-10 should incorporate the requirement that on entry to and exit from a theatre level detention facility, CPErS are proactively asked whether or not they have any complaints concerning their treatment. This should not be done in the presence of the capturing soldiers/unit.

JDP 1-10 should address the protection that will be afforded to service personnel who make complaints or allegations in good faith of the mistreatment of CPErS. It should give guidance as to those who can be approached when service personnel have concerns about the treatment of CPErS.

Urgent consideration must be given to amending the tactical questioning policy to make clear what approaches are and are not authorised for use in tactical questioning. In future all tactical questioning and interrogational policies should descend to greater detail on approaches, as a minimum making clear which approaches are authorised for use in which discipline.

To the extent that the MoD considers that the harsh approach can still lawfully be used in interrogation: (1) there is a need for very clear guidance to be given within the interrogation policy; (2) the approach should be given a label which is less apt to be misinterpreted; (3) the approach should not include an analogy with a military drill sergeant; (4) specific Ministerial approval should be sought before the harsh approach is approved for use in any operational theatre.

The interrogation policy should require, as part of the auditing process, a review of a selection of video recordings of interrogations of the inspector's choosing. Interrogators should know that the recordings of their interrogations may be inspected in this way.

Armed Forces medical personnel can and should be involved in providing advice that a CPErS is not fit for detention or questioning. Alternatively, the medic may validly advise that no specific intervention different from the normal process is required. Medics should not advise that a CPErS is fit for detention or fit for questioning.

The medical policy for CPErS should include: (1) CPErS must undergo a medical examination within four hours of capture, unless there are compelling circumstances; (2) CPErS should be examined by a qualified doctor as soon as reasonably practicable; (3) the non-medical chain of command should be prohibited from allowing interrogation until the CPErS has been medically examined; (4) an electronic or written record of the examination should be made and preserved.

SOI J3-9 should reflect the greater emphasis that is given in the latest draft of JDP 1-10 to avoiding in the first place, where practicable, circumstances in which sight deprivation may be necessary. More generally, it should reflect the five principles in recommendation 10.

Where practicable CPErS who are subjected to sight deprivation or hearing deprivation should be told the reason for it. If being deprived of their sight for some or part of a journey by road or air, CPErS should be told in general terms where they are being taken.

CPErS documents should be as few in number as possible but they require amendment to ensure that those involved in detention are guided more accurately on what to record. Current CPERS documents have no obvious place for soldiers to record the use of sensory deprivation.

The MoD should continue its recent practice of ensuring that theatre level instructions and procedures for CPErS are contained within a single comprehensive order that is kept up to date and which can be easily handed over to incoming formations in enduring operations.

The Provost Marshal (Army) should formally review whether the current practice of using blacked out goggles for all movement of CPErS within Temporary Holding Facilities is strictly necessary and ensure that it is not being used in circumstances that are not clearly justified.

Each Battlegroup should have a 'Detention Officer' being a commissioned officer within Battlegroup Headquarters. The role should encompass coordination and management of CPErS; acting as a focus on CPErS matters during mission specific training; ensuring correct handling of CPErS; assisting the Commanding Officer during operations.

On operations where CPErS may be taken there should be a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) who acts as the 'Detention Sergeant' who has responsibility for the administrative aspects of CPErS handling. In most cases, it would be appropriate for the regimental Provost Sergeant to fulfil this role.

The PM(A) and those who in his name carry out inspections of the main operational detention facilities should be expressly recognised as having the right and duty to inspect CPErS handling throughout the detention process including during interrogation.

The PM(A) and the in theatre Force Provost Marshal should take account of the in theatre situation in assessing whether any unannounced MPS inspections of forward detention facilities would be feasible and beneficial. The unit detention officer should be able to carry out less formal checks at unit and sub-unit level.

The MoD should consider whether the lessons learned procedures need to be adjusted or supplemented so that the clearer and more urgent lessons and changes to previous practice are fed back far more quickly both to the operational theatre and into the pre-deployment training cycle.

CPErS training should be woven into the full range of military exercises and training. Such training should be 'end to end', not just focused on planning and the actual combat side of the operation, but including what happens after a CPErS is captured. Exercises for commanders need to test and train them in CPErS handling issues.

Training materials across the Services need to be reviewed to ensure that the messages about all aspects of CPErS handling are clear and consistent. The arrangement whereby the PM(A) will act as a coordinator and validator of prisoner handling training should assist in bringing greater consistency.

The MATT 7 PowerPoint presentation on the five techniques should be amended to ensure that the definitions of the techniques are consistent with amendments to JDP 1-10; that it is clear that the techniques are not only prohibited as aids to interrogation; and so that the background information section is fully accurate.

The 2005 prisoner handling DVD should be amended to avoid misleading messages about sight deprivation in the context of interrogation, and the inappropriate presentation of the interrogation facility. 'Bagged and tagged' is an ambiguous phrase which should not be used.

Greater clarity and guidance should be given in training in relation to the concept of 'restraint positions'. More must be done to give practical guidance to help service personnel distinguish between unlawful stress positions and the legitimate use of force.

Training soldiers to maintain or prolong the shock of capture is apt to be misunderstood and should not feature in general training. Phrases such as 'calm, neutral and professional' and 'firm, fair and efficient' can properly be used as shorthand for those involved in CPErS handling.

MATT 6 training should include discussion and role play scenarios relevant to moral courage. Training materials should include reference to occasions when UK troops have breached the Law of Armed Conflict to avoid any risk of complacency about the conduct of UK Forces.

The annual legal review of training materials planned by Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) is a necessary step. It must include a rigorous scrutiny of the detail of the presentations and speaking notes used on the tactical questioning and interrogation courses.

A more senior and more independent legal review of the kind now being conducted as a one off ad hoc review is also required. Such a review should not be necessary on an annual basis but should provide a suitable measure of further assurance if conducted every three years.

DISC should take immediate remedial action to ensure that: (1) old versions of interrogation branch teaching materials are retained but archived separately; (2) interrogation branch teaching materials are always dated; (3) when legal advice or policy changes require changes to materials, the changes are checked for accuracy and made consistently.

The tactical questioning and interrogation courses must train students adequately in all approaches that they may be required to use operationally. The current compromise whereby tactical questioning students are given an idea of the harsh approach but not trained fully in it should cease.

'Conditioning' should cease to be used as an approved Chicksands or HUMINT term. The term is dangerously ambiguous since it can be used to refer to unlawful means of putting pressure on a prisoner as well the intended meaning of the legitimate use of existing pressures.

DISC should give consideration to avoiding the terminology 'maintain the shock of capture' and 'prolong the shock of capture' even in their own courses. As a minimum, students on the TQ and interrogation courses should be expressly warned of the dangers of unqualified personnel misunderstanding these phrases.

All theoretical and practical resistance training must include a warning which explains in terms that the training is to show conduct that can be expected of a non-Geneva Conventions compliant enemy and does not reflect the standards required of British and NATO forces.

When reviewing the current Survive, Evade, Resist and Extract (SERE) DVD, Defence Survival Training Organisation (DSTO) should take into account the latest developments in tactical questioning and interrogation policy. DSTO should seek to ensure that ambiguity of terms is avoided as far as possible.

The MoD must make all units aware that, not only is DSTO the only body trained to provide resistance training, but that if any escape and evasion training is carried out it must under no circumstances involve the use of any of the prohibited five techniques nor any element of conduct after capture or resistance to interrogation training.

The Military Correction Training Centre (MCTC) should continue to monitor that breakaway, personal protection and control and restraint techniques taught on the All Arms Unit Custody Staff Course (AAUCSC) are appropriate having regard to a realistic assessment of the number of unit custody staff likely to be on duty.