The Anthony Grainger Inquiry

A national policing body should manage a national register of recommendations relating to armed policing, and the response to such recommendations, arising from Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) reports, prevention of future death reports made in the course of inquests, and statutory inquiries concerning fatal police shootings.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should conduct a thematic inspection or inspections concerning: (i) the selection and training of officers authorised to use weapons requiring special authorisation; (ii) the selection and training of officers authorised to command incidents involving the use of weapons requiring special authorisation; (iii) the selection and training of officers authorised to provide tactical advice relating to the use of weapons requiring special authorisation; (iv) compliance with the Code and/or the Armed Policing module of the College of Policing's Authorised Professional Practice (APP) relating to the police use of firearms; and (v) compliance with the Code and/or APP concerning the procurement and use of special munitions.

The Home Secretary should ensure that the new Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons contains an express prohibition on the use of a new weapon system by the police service until the approval process set out in the Code has been completed.

The North West Armed Policing Standard Operating Procedure on Weapons and Ammunition should be amended so that it only permits the use of new specialist munitions that have been approved in accordance with the Code of Practice for Armed Policing and Less Lethal Weapons.

Greater Manchester Police (GMP) should design and promulgate a written policy that specifically relates to the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence for the purposes of planned armed deployments within the meaning of the Armed Policing module of Authorised Professional Practice (APP).

All documents and training relating to Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) should: clearly differentiate between MASTS as an operational method of supporting surveillance (and delivering a standard range of tactical options), and the additional tactical options of 'intervention' and 'interception' that MASTS trained authorised firearms officers (AFOs) can deliver; make clear that a MASTS deployment authorisation should not be taken to imply that 'intervention' or 'interception' are preauthorised or preferred tactical outcomes; note that decisive action by MASTS officers is a high-risk option and explain what factors lead to higher risks (for example, the presence of a subject inside a stationary vehicle); and make clear that the reasons for any strategic or tactical command decision in a firearms operation (including any decision to authorise such an operation) must be recorded at the time the decision is made unless it is impracticable to do so, in which case such reasons, together with a full explanation for not recording them at the time, must be recorded as soon as possible.

During post incident proceedings following a police shooting, NPCC should consider the advantages of: Recordings of the communications of firearms commanders and authorised firearms officers (AFOs); And video recordings from the body-worn video cameras of AFOs and police vehicles involved in decisive action.

The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) should consider whether to recommend equipping unmarked vehicles used in Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS) interventions with apparatus designed to identify to subjects that those conducting such interventions are police officers - specifically (i) the illumination of previously concealed blue lights on unmarked police vehicles; and/or (ii) integral loudspeaker systems that could be used to broadcast information or instructions outside such a vehicle.

The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the College of Policing should jointly decide, in the light of independent expert advice, whether there should be a maximum period of time during which authorised firearms officers (AFOs) are permitted to remain on continuous duty and, if so, should ensure that this maximum period is specified in national guidance.