Richard Brookes
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2024-0638
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 13 Jan 2025
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
DWP systems failed to properly assess and safeguard a vulnerable adult receiving a large arrears payment, resulting in a lack of clear communication and exacerbating the patient's paranoia about the money.
View full coroner's concerns
During the inquest, I heard that Rick was a vulnerable adult. He had a diagnosis of possible paranoid schizophrenia and was taking anti-psychotic medication.
Rick was receiving support from the DWP. I heard from from the DWP that he was in receipt of ESA and DLA until 2016 when his DLA was transferred to PIP. At this point, this should have triggered an additional payment the Severe Disability Payment on his ESA. This didn’t happen and DWP accepted in evidence that this was an error. There was then a delay in rectifying that error. In November 2023 the missed SDP calculation was identified and steps were taken to rectify it. By November 2023 the DWP stated in evidence that they owed Rick over £37,000 in arrears.
told the inquest that the DWP Guidance for Making Large Payments states that in the case of vulnerable individuals, which Rick had been identified as being, should be dealt with by the CEAST team. said that the process should have been that Rick was spoken to by an agent who would assess how best to make the repayment in light of any known vulnerabilities he had. However, there is no qualitative record of that conversations beyond a drop down menu on the Severe Disability Journey Management System and “Phone Call Made” being selected as “Yes”. There is no record of the content of that conversation.
On the evidence, I found it is likely that a call did take place. However without the notes, it is not possible to evaluate what was said, how long the call took and what steps were put in place to ensure that Rick understood the information within the call. Without any notes of the call, it is also not possible to assess what Rick was asked about his state of mind, any vulnerabilities he was experiencing and his ability to safely manage the receipt of large payments of money.
The first DWP large payment was made on the 8th December 2023 of £5,000, which was paid directly into Rick’s bank account. Prior to this date, Rick had been receiving benefits to the amount of under £300 per week plus a monthly stipend of money from his family of around £300. This was therefore a significant increase in his income. It was clear to me from the evidence from Rick’s sister that he became paranoid about the source of that money, indicating to me that any call from the DWP wasn’t understood fully, or that it fed into a period of delusional thinking. The text messages he sent to his sister in the days prior to his death indicate that he didn’t know where the money was coming from.
1. This was a large payment of money to a vulnerable adult who was then required to self-manage that money. In these situations, it is important that there are robust systems in place for ensuring that the requisite assessments and checks are made of an individual to ensure that large payments can be made in a way that does not increase any vulnerability.
2. I heard evidence from that the DWP systems that are currently in place are hybrid of electronic and clerical systems and that payments can be initiated without there being a full note on the system of the content of the call with the individual.
3. I am therefore concerned that there is no way that an agent, quality assessor or team leader can properly evaluate whether any agreement made between the DWP and an individual regarding repayment has fully considered all the relevant factors regarding their vulnerabilities before a large payment is made.
4. I am also concerned that the DWP currently has no ability to effectively audit its large payments caseload to ascertain whether the failure in record keeping evident in the present case has occurred in other cases.
Rick was receiving support from the DWP. I heard from from the DWP that he was in receipt of ESA and DLA until 2016 when his DLA was transferred to PIP. At this point, this should have triggered an additional payment the Severe Disability Payment on his ESA. This didn’t happen and DWP accepted in evidence that this was an error. There was then a delay in rectifying that error. In November 2023 the missed SDP calculation was identified and steps were taken to rectify it. By November 2023 the DWP stated in evidence that they owed Rick over £37,000 in arrears.
told the inquest that the DWP Guidance for Making Large Payments states that in the case of vulnerable individuals, which Rick had been identified as being, should be dealt with by the CEAST team. said that the process should have been that Rick was spoken to by an agent who would assess how best to make the repayment in light of any known vulnerabilities he had. However, there is no qualitative record of that conversations beyond a drop down menu on the Severe Disability Journey Management System and “Phone Call Made” being selected as “Yes”. There is no record of the content of that conversation.
On the evidence, I found it is likely that a call did take place. However without the notes, it is not possible to evaluate what was said, how long the call took and what steps were put in place to ensure that Rick understood the information within the call. Without any notes of the call, it is also not possible to assess what Rick was asked about his state of mind, any vulnerabilities he was experiencing and his ability to safely manage the receipt of large payments of money.
The first DWP large payment was made on the 8th December 2023 of £5,000, which was paid directly into Rick’s bank account. Prior to this date, Rick had been receiving benefits to the amount of under £300 per week plus a monthly stipend of money from his family of around £300. This was therefore a significant increase in his income. It was clear to me from the evidence from Rick’s sister that he became paranoid about the source of that money, indicating to me that any call from the DWP wasn’t understood fully, or that it fed into a period of delusional thinking. The text messages he sent to his sister in the days prior to his death indicate that he didn’t know where the money was coming from.
1. This was a large payment of money to a vulnerable adult who was then required to self-manage that money. In these situations, it is important that there are robust systems in place for ensuring that the requisite assessments and checks are made of an individual to ensure that large payments can be made in a way that does not increase any vulnerability.
2. I heard evidence from that the DWP systems that are currently in place are hybrid of electronic and clerical systems and that payments can be initiated without there being a full note on the system of the content of the call with the individual.
3. I am therefore concerned that there is no way that an agent, quality assessor or team leader can properly evaluate whether any agreement made between the DWP and an individual regarding repayment has fully considered all the relevant factors regarding their vulnerabilities before a large payment is made.
4. I am also concerned that the DWP currently has no ability to effectively audit its large payments caseload to ascertain whether the failure in record keeping evident in the present case has occurred in other cases.
Responses
Action Planned
The DWP outlines planned improvements to processes for large payments to vulnerable adults, including enhanced vulnerability training for staff, improved recording of interactions on systems, and a new audit process, with expected implementation by April 2025. (AI summary)
The DWP outlines planned improvements to processes for large payments to vulnerable adults, including enhanced vulnerability training for staff, improved recording of interactions on systems, and a new audit process, with expected implementation by April 2025. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Morris,
RESPONSE TO REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
We write on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) in response to your Prevention of Future Deaths Report made under Regulation 28 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. We would like to take this opportunity to express our condolences, both personally and on behalf of DWP, to the family of Mr Richard Brookes (“Mr Brookes”). You raised the following concerns in your report:
1. This was a large payment of money to a vulnerable adult who was then required to self-manage that money. In these situations, it is important that there are robust systems in place for ensuring that the requisite assessments and checks are made of an individual to ensure that large payments can be made in a way that does not increase any vulnerability.
2. I heard evidence from [DWP] that the DWP systems that are currently in place are hybrid of electronic and clerical systems and that payments can be initiated without there being a full note on the system of the content of the call with the individual.
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3. I am therefore concerned that there is no way that an agent, quality assessor or team leader can properly evaluate whether any agreement made between the DWP and an individual regarding repayment has fully considered all the relevant factors regarding their vulnerabilities before a large payment is made.
4. I am also concerned that the DWP currently has no ability to effectively audit its large payments caseload to ascertain whether the failure in record keeping evident in the present case has occurred in other cases.
Our response to your concerns is as follows:
(1) DWP processes in place to ensure large payments can be made in a way that does not increase a customer’s vulnerability The department has Making Large Payments guidance to support colleagues that administer large payments to customers who may face challenges receiving or handling such payments, as a result of declared or known complex needs. Where we identify that a customer may benefit from additional support with a large payment (resulting from, for example, a previous underpayment or backdated payment decision), the department will discuss the payment with the customer or their representative and signpost them to support if required. The guidance [Annex A] defines a large payment as £2,000 or more and applies to every benefit administered by DWP. The exception to this definition is where a customer’s usual monthly Universal Credit (“UC”) payment is over £2,000, in which case the threshold used is whether the amount is twice their normal UC payment. The guidance prompts DWP agents to consider vulnerabilities and mitigate the risk that receiving a large amount of money might expose a customer to. Different departmental computer systems must be checked for key indicators of potential vulnerability, such as neglect, domestic abuse, physical or sexual abuse, or modern slavery. For DWP purposes, the description of vulnerability is 'an individual who is identified as having complex needs and/or requires additional support to enable them to access DWP benefits and use our services'. Complex needs are defined as ‘difficult personal circumstances and/or life events that affect the ability of the individual to access DWP benefits and use our services’. A checklist helps agents establish whether a customer has vulnerabilities or an appointee. Factors to consider include, but are not limited to, the following:
• additional support already noted on a departmental system
• addictions
• risk of financial exploitation
• homelessness
• mental health issues If there are no concerns identified, normal payment routes will be followed and notes inputted onto the computer system. If, following system checks, a concern is identified the case will be paused and the payment will not be made. Relevant local agencies will be identified before a call is made to the customer to discuss payment options and the support available to help them manage the money.
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Official The customer is free to choose how they wish to receive their payment from options including:
• lump sum payment,
• payment to a third party, or
• staggered payments over a period of time. DWP cannot legally withhold benefit from a customer or force them to receive their payment in a particular way. If, following the call, an agent still has concerns about a customer’s vulnerability, the case will be escalated before any payment is made. Escalation routes include liaising with Vulnerable Customer Champions (“VCCs”), the Customer Experience Advanced Support Team (“CEAST”) and Advanced Customer Support Senior Leaders (“ACSSLs”), further described below. VCCs, CEAST and ACSSLs will decide how best to provide support, and agents must follow the steps agreed and update the system with the action taken. CEAST teams within Working Age (the business area where ESA sits) were established in January 2021 to support colleagues who identify customers with vulnerabilities and who need advanced support. CEAST have VCCs based in all processing and telephony teams. VCCs are the first level of additional support available to DWP colleagues working to ensure vulnerable customers receive tailored support. If the VCC has any complex queries that cannot be resolved as part of standard processes, they will escalate to CEAST as the next level of additional support for more complex cases. If yet further support is required, CEAST will refer to the ACSSL as the most advanced level of support available. Key to the ACSSL role is the building and maintaining of relationships with external organisations that support vulnerable citizens, acting as a link into external agencies’ escalation routes, enabling increased cross-agency case collaboration and more holistic support for customers. DWP has a network of ACSSLs throughout Great Britain, who coach and engage with colleagues across DWP services to help support its most vulnerable customers. In Mr Brookes’ case the Making Large Payments guidance was used as the amount owed to him was over £2,000 and the agent identified him as vulnerable. Despite not recording system notes, the agent is confident that they called Mr Brookes and discussed his payment options. As a result of that call the large payment was broken down into smaller amounts, quality checked and scheduled to be issued over eight months. The department accepts that the notes recorded by the agent were inadequate and there was no record of what was discussed and decided during the call with Mr Brookes. Feedback has been given to the agent regarding the need to record details of the conversations leading to the splitting of payments in this way. Existing guidance does not expressly state that recording notes of calls with customers on computer systems is mandatory, although training packages and upskilling communications do include the need to do this. The department is reviewing the Making Large Payments guidance within Working Age, with a view to mandating that any calls made, and any agreements reached, be recorded on the DWP systems, and that any related documents are stored in the digital repository. The department is also designing a letter to be issued to customers who have requested or agreed a staggered payment. Whilst this activity is currently localised within Working Age, improvement teams across the department are working together to monitor the progress, to potentially influence wider guidance changes.
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Official As part of the learning the department has taken from Mr Brookes’ case, an upskilling communication has been circulated to all colleagues within Working Age to remind them of the correct process to follow when making large payments. This includes the requirement to consider the size of the payments and the importance of recording conversations with customers.
(2) Limitations of the DWP computer systems used to administer Employment and Support Allowance, and supporting guidance for vulnerable customers The process of administering Employment and Support Allowance (“ESA”) involves the use of a number of different, standalone IT systems. JSAPS (Job Seekers Allowance Payment System) is the DWP system used to manage the day-to-day assessment, award, payment and maintenance of ESA. JSAPS is over 22 years old and therefore has limited functionality. It is relevant to this case to note that JSAPS does not have the function to stagger ESA payments, like Mr Brookes’ Severe Disability Premium (“SDP”) arrears, and a separate, standalone system is used to make these payments. In cases where high value payments to ESA customers need to be broken up, like Mr Brookes’ case, the department has ‘Staggered Payments’ guidance [Annex B] to support agents because different systems need to be used. As this part of the process is manual it means there is no built-in checklist or system generated prompt to check for accuracy. However, the departmental process does specify that the calculations and the decision should be referred to a team leader for verification. In Mr Brookes’ case, records confirm the calculations were verified by a quality checker and the staggered payments were verified by a team leader before being inputted to the payment system.
(3) How the Move to UC will improve the way relevant factors regarding a customer’s vulnerabilities are checked and assured before large payments are made As explained above, JSAPS does not have a built-in checklist to confirm every step of the Making Large Payments process has been completed, specifically the notes of the conversation between the agent and the customer. Neither is there any functionality to block a payment being issued where the checklist is incomplete. To mitigate this, internal processes and quality assurance have been improved and are further described below. As the department plans to close some legacy benefits, including Income Related ESA, by the end of March 2026, there are no plans to invest money or resources in the outgoing computer systems. The work required to update the old JSAPS system would be expensive and an inefficient use of resources, so instead policy and guidance are reviewed to support colleagues using the legacy benefit systems. Existing Income Related ESA customers will migrate to UC which operates on a digital platform, known as “the UC Service”. This has additional functionality including both automated and agent led processes. UC will now be briefly explained, as well as how the process of making large payments will be improved on the UC system. UC was introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 to replace six legacy benefits, including ESA, with a single, streamlined and simplified, digitally delivered benefit system that provides work incentives for those who can work and support for those who cannot. UC has been introduced in a controlled and phased manner with legislation preventing new claims to working age income related benefits and existing legacy benefit claims terminated if a claim to UC is made. This means all new claims for income related benefit are now to UC.
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Official All customers currently claiming legacy benefits who want to maintain their entitlement to income-related working age benefit will have to make a claim to UC. They may choose to make a claim to UC (voluntary migration), or they may experience a change of circumstance that means they need to claim UC (natural migration). The remainder of legacy benefit customers, who do not move voluntarily or through natural migration, will be informed that they must claim UC to maintain their benefit entitlement (managed migration). On 12 November 2024 the Minister for Social Security and Disability announced that DWP will steadily increase the number of migration notices being sent to customers receiving ESA over the next months, with all notices due to be sent by the end of 2025. UC has specific guidance on ‘Handling Larger Payments’ which compliments the department’s Making Large Payments guidance. It supports UC agents handling circumstances like those of Mr Brookes, where a UC customer may be due a large payment. It recognises that some customers may find receiving and managing a large payment challenging for a variety of reasons such as their personal circumstances, risk of financial abuse, or difficulties in understanding, processing or managing financial matters. As Mr Brookes was not a UC customer, it was the Making Large Payments guidance and not the Handling Larger Payments guidance that was used in his case. The UC guidance is included here to provide assurances that UC has processes to support agents and customers in these circumstances. The UC specific guidance advises colleagues to investigate which other benefits a customer may be claiming to identify any vulnerabilities that may have been disclosed elsewhere. That information must be used to decide how to best support the customer. Where an agent identifies that a customer may need additional support, they must:
• call the customer or their appointee before making the payment to discuss whether the customer requires support,
• make at least 3 contact attempts over two days. If there is no appointee, the agent will advise the customer through their journal that they are going to phone to discuss making a payment,
• consider using other departmental systems to see if other contact numbers are listed where attempts to contact the customer are unsuccessful,
• record a note in the 'Customer history' of the UC account detailing the actions taken. If contact is made, the agent must:
• explain to the customer the amount of arrears payment they are entitled to and why.
• ask the customer if it would support them to: i) receive this as a lump sum, ii) have the payment made to another person, iii) have the payment staggered over a number of months, or iv) have a combination of these put into place,
• consider signposting the customer to third party support,
• record details of the conversation and choice made by the customer and attach a pinned note to the claim regarding any payment arrangements agreed. If an agent has any concerns or has been unable to contact the customer or their appointee, the case can be escalated to the ACSSL by a Team Leader for advice on how to proceed before releasing the payment.
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Official When all steps have been exhausted and no contact has been made or the customer has failed to engage, the customer is still entitled to the payment and it must be issued. All the actions taken must be documented before this decision is made. Where an agent decides that the customer does not require additional support, they can make the payment in one lump sum. Alongside the Handling Larger Payments guidance, the UC Service has a check list, known as a ‘to-do’, built into the system to guide the agent through the process described above step by step. The checklist does not specify that a note must be made of the conversation with the customer but it does contain a notes field, and the expected standard across DWP is that when a call is made to the customer notes are recorded in either in the notes field of the ‘to-do’ or in the history notes section of the UC claim. The Service prompts the agent to check for additional support needs and, if identified, the customer must be contacted and alternative payment methods offered. If the agent has not answered any of the questions in the to-do, they cannot progress to the next stage. This is a robust feature built into the computer system that the ESA systems could not provide.
(4) How ESA audits its large payments caseload to prevent errors occurring Severe Disability Payment Arrears Review To prevent and rectify errors on ESA claims, a specialist team was set up within Working Age to review cases where ESA customers were claiming Personal Independence Payment (“PIP”) but did not have the Severe Disability Payment (SDP) element which they may have been eligible for. Receipt of PIP is one of the qualifying criteria for SDP. As Mr Brookes had been reawarded PIP in 2020 his case fell under the scope of this team. As a result of the issues identified in Mr Brookes’ case, activity has taken place within that specialist team to improve compliance with the Making Large Payments guidance. Clerical forms have been revised to prompt agents to:
• establish whether the customer is vulnerable,
• confirm a call has been made to the customer,
• record all conversations that have taken place with the customer,
• record all decisions made about how the customer wants to receive the payment.
The revised forms are checked by Team Leaders on every case to ensure compliance with guidance, including a check that calls have been made to customers, where appropriate, and that notes have been made. Agents are required to provide any missing or unclear information as a priority. In addition to the Team Leader check, the case goes through a quality assurance check by a separate team. This quality assurance check reviews the entire process, including a check of calculations of high value payments. This has introduced a two-tier, holistic check that was not in place before Mr Brookes’ case. Since introducing these more robust checks Team Leaders have been able to coach agents in the level of detail the revised forms require. Team Leaders are also now verifying cases where no vulnerability has been identified by an agent to avoid any doubt that vulnerability has been considered. This extra assurance activity only applies to this specialist team working on SDP cases and is not currently a national process. Nationally, teams follow the existing process for Making Large Payments which includes service assurance checks regarding the value of the payments and quality assurance checks as set out below.
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Two-Tier Quality Assurance Framework In addition to the specific, improved multi-level checks mentioned above, the department does have a robust, two-tier quality assurance process to ensure colleagues are adhering to DWP’s Quality Framework. This framework is used to check the Making Large Payments process. The Framework includes Customer Support Standards which were designed specifically to improve the experience of customers with complex needs and significantly reduce instances of serious cases by providing the right support at the right time. The four Customer Support Standards are;
• Advance Customer Support
• Accessibility Requirements
• Appointees
• Six Point Plan (DWP’s response to declarations of suicide or self-harm)
The Customer Support Standards are incorporated in both tiers of the department’s quality assurance process and focuses on customer experience. Tier 1 checks see line managers checking samples of their team’s work. This identifies individual errors or non-compliance with guidance and allows for immediate feedback and coaching. For example, if there is no evidence of a call being made to the customer to discuss making a large payment, then feedback would be given to update the system with the action taken and decisions made. Tier 2 checks see a dedicated quality team checking a sample of customer cases to assure compliance with relevant guidance and processes. Where an error against the Customer Support Standards at Tier 2 is identified, a pause is put in place to consider how any correction activity might affect a customer’s vulnerability. This is fed back directly to the service line to make colleagues aware of the risk to be managed when rectifying the error. The department’s Quality Assurance processes are intended to reinforce training and upskilling campaigns. They enable DWP to identify where additional support could have been provided to customers with varying needs or vulnerabilities, reducing the risk of a negative customer experience and potential development into serious cases.
Conclusion The department is committed to ensuring that customers are given the right support at the right time. This commitment is reflected in the improvements that have already been made to record keeping and quality assurance checks where vulnerable ESA customers are entitled to large sums of money. Robust guidance exists which supports agents to follow the correct process and support vulnerable customers in these complex cases. Escalation routes into more specialised, advanced support are already in place to ensure that vulnerable customers receive a tailored service. As Income Related ESA customers are migrated onto UC, vulnerable customers will be supported by guidance specific to UC and the improved functionality of the UC Service, seeing clerical forms being replaced by an automated process. We hope that our response addresses your concerns and helps to assure you of DWP’s commitment to improving the service it provides to vulnerable customers.
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Official
RESPONSE TO REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
We write on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) in response to your Prevention of Future Deaths Report made under Regulation 28 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. We would like to take this opportunity to express our condolences, both personally and on behalf of DWP, to the family of Mr Richard Brookes (“Mr Brookes”). You raised the following concerns in your report:
1. This was a large payment of money to a vulnerable adult who was then required to self-manage that money. In these situations, it is important that there are robust systems in place for ensuring that the requisite assessments and checks are made of an individual to ensure that large payments can be made in a way that does not increase any vulnerability.
2. I heard evidence from [DWP] that the DWP systems that are currently in place are hybrid of electronic and clerical systems and that payments can be initiated without there being a full note on the system of the content of the call with the individual.
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Official
3. I am therefore concerned that there is no way that an agent, quality assessor or team leader can properly evaluate whether any agreement made between the DWP and an individual regarding repayment has fully considered all the relevant factors regarding their vulnerabilities before a large payment is made.
4. I am also concerned that the DWP currently has no ability to effectively audit its large payments caseload to ascertain whether the failure in record keeping evident in the present case has occurred in other cases.
Our response to your concerns is as follows:
(1) DWP processes in place to ensure large payments can be made in a way that does not increase a customer’s vulnerability The department has Making Large Payments guidance to support colleagues that administer large payments to customers who may face challenges receiving or handling such payments, as a result of declared or known complex needs. Where we identify that a customer may benefit from additional support with a large payment (resulting from, for example, a previous underpayment or backdated payment decision), the department will discuss the payment with the customer or their representative and signpost them to support if required. The guidance [Annex A] defines a large payment as £2,000 or more and applies to every benefit administered by DWP. The exception to this definition is where a customer’s usual monthly Universal Credit (“UC”) payment is over £2,000, in which case the threshold used is whether the amount is twice their normal UC payment. The guidance prompts DWP agents to consider vulnerabilities and mitigate the risk that receiving a large amount of money might expose a customer to. Different departmental computer systems must be checked for key indicators of potential vulnerability, such as neglect, domestic abuse, physical or sexual abuse, or modern slavery. For DWP purposes, the description of vulnerability is 'an individual who is identified as having complex needs and/or requires additional support to enable them to access DWP benefits and use our services'. Complex needs are defined as ‘difficult personal circumstances and/or life events that affect the ability of the individual to access DWP benefits and use our services’. A checklist helps agents establish whether a customer has vulnerabilities or an appointee. Factors to consider include, but are not limited to, the following:
• additional support already noted on a departmental system
• addictions
• risk of financial exploitation
• homelessness
• mental health issues If there are no concerns identified, normal payment routes will be followed and notes inputted onto the computer system. If, following system checks, a concern is identified the case will be paused and the payment will not be made. Relevant local agencies will be identified before a call is made to the customer to discuss payment options and the support available to help them manage the money.
3
Official The customer is free to choose how they wish to receive their payment from options including:
• lump sum payment,
• payment to a third party, or
• staggered payments over a period of time. DWP cannot legally withhold benefit from a customer or force them to receive their payment in a particular way. If, following the call, an agent still has concerns about a customer’s vulnerability, the case will be escalated before any payment is made. Escalation routes include liaising with Vulnerable Customer Champions (“VCCs”), the Customer Experience Advanced Support Team (“CEAST”) and Advanced Customer Support Senior Leaders (“ACSSLs”), further described below. VCCs, CEAST and ACSSLs will decide how best to provide support, and agents must follow the steps agreed and update the system with the action taken. CEAST teams within Working Age (the business area where ESA sits) were established in January 2021 to support colleagues who identify customers with vulnerabilities and who need advanced support. CEAST have VCCs based in all processing and telephony teams. VCCs are the first level of additional support available to DWP colleagues working to ensure vulnerable customers receive tailored support. If the VCC has any complex queries that cannot be resolved as part of standard processes, they will escalate to CEAST as the next level of additional support for more complex cases. If yet further support is required, CEAST will refer to the ACSSL as the most advanced level of support available. Key to the ACSSL role is the building and maintaining of relationships with external organisations that support vulnerable citizens, acting as a link into external agencies’ escalation routes, enabling increased cross-agency case collaboration and more holistic support for customers. DWP has a network of ACSSLs throughout Great Britain, who coach and engage with colleagues across DWP services to help support its most vulnerable customers. In Mr Brookes’ case the Making Large Payments guidance was used as the amount owed to him was over £2,000 and the agent identified him as vulnerable. Despite not recording system notes, the agent is confident that they called Mr Brookes and discussed his payment options. As a result of that call the large payment was broken down into smaller amounts, quality checked and scheduled to be issued over eight months. The department accepts that the notes recorded by the agent were inadequate and there was no record of what was discussed and decided during the call with Mr Brookes. Feedback has been given to the agent regarding the need to record details of the conversations leading to the splitting of payments in this way. Existing guidance does not expressly state that recording notes of calls with customers on computer systems is mandatory, although training packages and upskilling communications do include the need to do this. The department is reviewing the Making Large Payments guidance within Working Age, with a view to mandating that any calls made, and any agreements reached, be recorded on the DWP systems, and that any related documents are stored in the digital repository. The department is also designing a letter to be issued to customers who have requested or agreed a staggered payment. Whilst this activity is currently localised within Working Age, improvement teams across the department are working together to monitor the progress, to potentially influence wider guidance changes.
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Official As part of the learning the department has taken from Mr Brookes’ case, an upskilling communication has been circulated to all colleagues within Working Age to remind them of the correct process to follow when making large payments. This includes the requirement to consider the size of the payments and the importance of recording conversations with customers.
(2) Limitations of the DWP computer systems used to administer Employment and Support Allowance, and supporting guidance for vulnerable customers The process of administering Employment and Support Allowance (“ESA”) involves the use of a number of different, standalone IT systems. JSAPS (Job Seekers Allowance Payment System) is the DWP system used to manage the day-to-day assessment, award, payment and maintenance of ESA. JSAPS is over 22 years old and therefore has limited functionality. It is relevant to this case to note that JSAPS does not have the function to stagger ESA payments, like Mr Brookes’ Severe Disability Premium (“SDP”) arrears, and a separate, standalone system is used to make these payments. In cases where high value payments to ESA customers need to be broken up, like Mr Brookes’ case, the department has ‘Staggered Payments’ guidance [Annex B] to support agents because different systems need to be used. As this part of the process is manual it means there is no built-in checklist or system generated prompt to check for accuracy. However, the departmental process does specify that the calculations and the decision should be referred to a team leader for verification. In Mr Brookes’ case, records confirm the calculations were verified by a quality checker and the staggered payments were verified by a team leader before being inputted to the payment system.
(3) How the Move to UC will improve the way relevant factors regarding a customer’s vulnerabilities are checked and assured before large payments are made As explained above, JSAPS does not have a built-in checklist to confirm every step of the Making Large Payments process has been completed, specifically the notes of the conversation between the agent and the customer. Neither is there any functionality to block a payment being issued where the checklist is incomplete. To mitigate this, internal processes and quality assurance have been improved and are further described below. As the department plans to close some legacy benefits, including Income Related ESA, by the end of March 2026, there are no plans to invest money or resources in the outgoing computer systems. The work required to update the old JSAPS system would be expensive and an inefficient use of resources, so instead policy and guidance are reviewed to support colleagues using the legacy benefit systems. Existing Income Related ESA customers will migrate to UC which operates on a digital platform, known as “the UC Service”. This has additional functionality including both automated and agent led processes. UC will now be briefly explained, as well as how the process of making large payments will be improved on the UC system. UC was introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 to replace six legacy benefits, including ESA, with a single, streamlined and simplified, digitally delivered benefit system that provides work incentives for those who can work and support for those who cannot. UC has been introduced in a controlled and phased manner with legislation preventing new claims to working age income related benefits and existing legacy benefit claims terminated if a claim to UC is made. This means all new claims for income related benefit are now to UC.
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Official All customers currently claiming legacy benefits who want to maintain their entitlement to income-related working age benefit will have to make a claim to UC. They may choose to make a claim to UC (voluntary migration), or they may experience a change of circumstance that means they need to claim UC (natural migration). The remainder of legacy benefit customers, who do not move voluntarily or through natural migration, will be informed that they must claim UC to maintain their benefit entitlement (managed migration). On 12 November 2024 the Minister for Social Security and Disability announced that DWP will steadily increase the number of migration notices being sent to customers receiving ESA over the next months, with all notices due to be sent by the end of 2025. UC has specific guidance on ‘Handling Larger Payments’ which compliments the department’s Making Large Payments guidance. It supports UC agents handling circumstances like those of Mr Brookes, where a UC customer may be due a large payment. It recognises that some customers may find receiving and managing a large payment challenging for a variety of reasons such as their personal circumstances, risk of financial abuse, or difficulties in understanding, processing or managing financial matters. As Mr Brookes was not a UC customer, it was the Making Large Payments guidance and not the Handling Larger Payments guidance that was used in his case. The UC guidance is included here to provide assurances that UC has processes to support agents and customers in these circumstances. The UC specific guidance advises colleagues to investigate which other benefits a customer may be claiming to identify any vulnerabilities that may have been disclosed elsewhere. That information must be used to decide how to best support the customer. Where an agent identifies that a customer may need additional support, they must:
• call the customer or their appointee before making the payment to discuss whether the customer requires support,
• make at least 3 contact attempts over two days. If there is no appointee, the agent will advise the customer through their journal that they are going to phone to discuss making a payment,
• consider using other departmental systems to see if other contact numbers are listed where attempts to contact the customer are unsuccessful,
• record a note in the 'Customer history' of the UC account detailing the actions taken. If contact is made, the agent must:
• explain to the customer the amount of arrears payment they are entitled to and why.
• ask the customer if it would support them to: i) receive this as a lump sum, ii) have the payment made to another person, iii) have the payment staggered over a number of months, or iv) have a combination of these put into place,
• consider signposting the customer to third party support,
• record details of the conversation and choice made by the customer and attach a pinned note to the claim regarding any payment arrangements agreed. If an agent has any concerns or has been unable to contact the customer or their appointee, the case can be escalated to the ACSSL by a Team Leader for advice on how to proceed before releasing the payment.
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Official When all steps have been exhausted and no contact has been made or the customer has failed to engage, the customer is still entitled to the payment and it must be issued. All the actions taken must be documented before this decision is made. Where an agent decides that the customer does not require additional support, they can make the payment in one lump sum. Alongside the Handling Larger Payments guidance, the UC Service has a check list, known as a ‘to-do’, built into the system to guide the agent through the process described above step by step. The checklist does not specify that a note must be made of the conversation with the customer but it does contain a notes field, and the expected standard across DWP is that when a call is made to the customer notes are recorded in either in the notes field of the ‘to-do’ or in the history notes section of the UC claim. The Service prompts the agent to check for additional support needs and, if identified, the customer must be contacted and alternative payment methods offered. If the agent has not answered any of the questions in the to-do, they cannot progress to the next stage. This is a robust feature built into the computer system that the ESA systems could not provide.
(4) How ESA audits its large payments caseload to prevent errors occurring Severe Disability Payment Arrears Review To prevent and rectify errors on ESA claims, a specialist team was set up within Working Age to review cases where ESA customers were claiming Personal Independence Payment (“PIP”) but did not have the Severe Disability Payment (SDP) element which they may have been eligible for. Receipt of PIP is one of the qualifying criteria for SDP. As Mr Brookes had been reawarded PIP in 2020 his case fell under the scope of this team. As a result of the issues identified in Mr Brookes’ case, activity has taken place within that specialist team to improve compliance with the Making Large Payments guidance. Clerical forms have been revised to prompt agents to:
• establish whether the customer is vulnerable,
• confirm a call has been made to the customer,
• record all conversations that have taken place with the customer,
• record all decisions made about how the customer wants to receive the payment.
The revised forms are checked by Team Leaders on every case to ensure compliance with guidance, including a check that calls have been made to customers, where appropriate, and that notes have been made. Agents are required to provide any missing or unclear information as a priority. In addition to the Team Leader check, the case goes through a quality assurance check by a separate team. This quality assurance check reviews the entire process, including a check of calculations of high value payments. This has introduced a two-tier, holistic check that was not in place before Mr Brookes’ case. Since introducing these more robust checks Team Leaders have been able to coach agents in the level of detail the revised forms require. Team Leaders are also now verifying cases where no vulnerability has been identified by an agent to avoid any doubt that vulnerability has been considered. This extra assurance activity only applies to this specialist team working on SDP cases and is not currently a national process. Nationally, teams follow the existing process for Making Large Payments which includes service assurance checks regarding the value of the payments and quality assurance checks as set out below.
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Two-Tier Quality Assurance Framework In addition to the specific, improved multi-level checks mentioned above, the department does have a robust, two-tier quality assurance process to ensure colleagues are adhering to DWP’s Quality Framework. This framework is used to check the Making Large Payments process. The Framework includes Customer Support Standards which were designed specifically to improve the experience of customers with complex needs and significantly reduce instances of serious cases by providing the right support at the right time. The four Customer Support Standards are;
• Advance Customer Support
• Accessibility Requirements
• Appointees
• Six Point Plan (DWP’s response to declarations of suicide or self-harm)
The Customer Support Standards are incorporated in both tiers of the department’s quality assurance process and focuses on customer experience. Tier 1 checks see line managers checking samples of their team’s work. This identifies individual errors or non-compliance with guidance and allows for immediate feedback and coaching. For example, if there is no evidence of a call being made to the customer to discuss making a large payment, then feedback would be given to update the system with the action taken and decisions made. Tier 2 checks see a dedicated quality team checking a sample of customer cases to assure compliance with relevant guidance and processes. Where an error against the Customer Support Standards at Tier 2 is identified, a pause is put in place to consider how any correction activity might affect a customer’s vulnerability. This is fed back directly to the service line to make colleagues aware of the risk to be managed when rectifying the error. The department’s Quality Assurance processes are intended to reinforce training and upskilling campaigns. They enable DWP to identify where additional support could have been provided to customers with varying needs or vulnerabilities, reducing the risk of a negative customer experience and potential development into serious cases.
Conclusion The department is committed to ensuring that customers are given the right support at the right time. This commitment is reflected in the improvements that have already been made to record keeping and quality assurance checks where vulnerable ESA customers are entitled to large sums of money. Robust guidance exists which supports agents to follow the correct process and support vulnerable customers in these complex cases. Escalation routes into more specialised, advanced support are already in place to ensure that vulnerable customers receive a tailored service. As Income Related ESA customers are migrated onto UC, vulnerable customers will be supported by guidance specific to UC and the improved functionality of the UC Service, seeing clerical forms being replaced by an automated process. We hope that our response addresses your concerns and helps to assure you of DWP’s commitment to improving the service it provides to vulnerable customers.
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- Department of Work and Pensions
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56-Day Deadline
13 Jan 2025
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Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On the 23rd February 2024, I commenced an investigation into the death of Richard William Brookes, known to his family as Rick. I heard an inquest touching on Rick’s death at Stockport Coroner’s Court on the 14th November 2024.
Circumstances of the Death
At the Inquest on the 14th November 2024, I returned a conclusion of suicide. In respect of the circumstances of the death I found that on the 25th January 2024, the deceased accessed the railway by the . He intentionally stepped in the path of an approaching train and was struck, causing catastrophic and fatal injuries.
In the days prior to his death, the deceased had been experiencing a crisis period in his mental health. He had been diagnosed with possible paranoid schizophrenia in 2011 and was taking anti-psychotic medication. In the days prior to his death he had been expressing paranoid thoughts to his family and was anxious and distressed. His deliberate actions combined with his expressions to his family prior to his death that he thought something would happen that day, led me to conclude that it is likely that he intended to end his own life.
In the days prior to his death, the deceased had been experiencing a crisis period in his mental health. He had been diagnosed with possible paranoid schizophrenia in 2011 and was taking anti-psychotic medication. In the days prior to his death he had been expressing paranoid thoughts to his family and was anxious and distressed. His deliberate actions combined with his expressions to his family prior to his death that he thought something would happen that day, led me to conclude that it is likely that he intended to end his own life.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.