Major Project Scope Uncertainty
22 items
2 sources
Uncertainty regarding the scope of major public projects, with political decision-making identified as a significant risk to progress.
Cross-Source Insight
Major Project Scope Uncertainty has been flagged across 2 independent accountability sources:
20 inquiry recs
2 PFD reports
This issue has been identified by multiple independent accountability bodies, suggesting it is a recurring systemic concern.
Inquiry Recommendations (20)
HIDD-29 — Appoint a single Project Manager for all major schemes
Recommendation: BR shall ensure that there is a single Project Manager for all major schemes, who shall be responsible for the overall planning, management and execution of the scheme.
Unknown
HIDD-30 — Ensure Project Managers have sufficient authority for safe scheme delivery
Recommendation: BR shall ensure that the Project Manager is of sufficient seniority and has sufficient authority to ensure that the scheme is delivered safely, efficiently and economically.
Unknown
HIDD-31 — Require external work to be contractual, specified by Project Manager
Recommendation: BR shall ensure that where work is required from areas outside the command of the person in overall charge, that work should be carried out on a contractual basis to a specification provided by the Project Manager.
Unknown
HIDD-32 — Establish direct reporting line for Testing Engineer to overall scheme charge
Recommendation: BR shall ensure that the Testing Engineer shall be ultimately responsible to the person in overall charge of the scheme, but not through the Project Manager.
Unknown
HIDD-49 — Develop system for allocating project priority to prevent safety compromise
Recommendation: BR shall develop an adequate system of allocating priority to projects to ensure that safety standards are not compromised by delay.
Unknown
ETI-18 — Effective Communication and Reporting
Recommendation: There should be effective communication and reporting at all stages of the project, including accurate progress reports to councillors and stakeholders, with clear escalation procedures for issues that may affect cost, programme or scope.
Gov response: Council Leader Cammy Day stated: 'We know that serious mistakes were made in the construction of the original tram line.' The Council broadly agrees with Lord Hardie's recommendations but notes improvements were already implemented for …
Accepted
No update 2+ yrs
ETI-19 — Collaborative Delivery
Recommendation: At all stages of the project there should be a collaborative approach to delivering it, including co-location of representatives from each organisation relevant to the particular stage, enabling issues to be addressed and resolved at the earliest opportunity, minimising risk …
Gov response: Council Leader Cammy Day stated: 'We know that serious mistakes were made in the construction of the original tram line.' The Council broadly agrees with Lord Hardie's recommendations but notes improvements were already implemented for …
Accepted
No update 2+ yrs
ETI-5 — Business Case Timing
Recommendation: Where Business Cases assume pre-contract completion of design, approvals, or utility diversions, contract negotiations should await completion; otherwise, a revised Business Case reflecting actual conditions must be prepared before signing.
Gov response: The Scottish Government stated it already operates in line with best practices for governance and light rail delivery. Source: Transport Secretary Statement, 2 November 2023.
Accepted
Delivered
ETI-6 — Optimism Bias in Business Cases
Recommendation: All Business Case versions must include risk assessments accounting for optimism bias per published government guidance.
Gov response: The Scottish Government stated it already operates in line with best practices for governance and light rail delivery. Source: Transport Secretary Statement, 2 November 2023.
Accepted
Delivered
ETI-7 — External Peer Review
Recommendation: Each Business Case risk assessment should undergo peer review by external consultants experienced in large-scale transportation infrastructure, submitting reports sufficiently before contract signature.
Gov response: The Scottish Government stated it already operates in line with best practices for governance and light rail delivery. Source: Transport Secretary Statement, 2 November 2023.
Accepted
Delivered
ETI-8 — Update Optimism Bias Guidance
Recommendation: Optimism bias guidance, based on decades-old data, requires updating to include light rail projects and reflect current empirical evidence, with reviews every five years.
Gov response: The Scottish Government stated it already operates in line with best practices but will consider updating guidance. Source: Transport Secretary Statement, 2 November 2023.
Accepted in Part
No update 2+ yrs
ETI-9 — Risk Management Standards
Recommendation: Risk identification and management should be integral to major public-sector contracts, employing probabilistic forecasts, critical review of mitigation claims, constant governance challenge, early warning detection, and quality-focused evidence rather than process emphasis.
Gov response: The Scottish Government stated it already operates in line with best practices for governance and light rail delivery. Source: Transport Secretary Statement, 2 November 2023.
Accepted
Delivered
F286 — Impact assessments before structural change
Recommendation: Impact and risk assessments should be made public, and debated publicly, before a proposal for any major structural change to the healthcare system is accepted. Such assessments should cover at least the following issues: What is the precise issue or …
Gov response: The government published "Hard Truths: the Journey to Putting Patients First" (Cm 8777) on 19 November 2013, responding to all 290 recommendations of the Francis Report. This followed an initial response "Patients First and Foremost" …
Accepted
36 — Impact assessment of policy changes
Recommendation: The cumulative impact of new policies and processes, particularly the perceived pressure to achieve Foundation Trust status, together with organisational reconfiguration, placed significant pressure on the management capacity of the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust to deliver …
Gov response: 97. We accept this recommendation in principle. We acknowledge the Investigation’s findings that the pursuit of Foundation Trust status distorted management capacity and priorities at Morecambe Bay. 98. In response to the failings at both …
Accepted
37 — Protocol for organisational change transitions
Recommendation: Organisational change that alters or transfers responsibilities and accountability carries significant risk, which can be mitigated only if well managed. We recommend that an explicit protocol be drawn up setting out how such processes will be managed in future. This …
Gov response: 100. We accept this recommendation. We agree that these are important concepts, and indeed a number of protocols were drawn up and widely communicated in managing changes to the health system in 2012. The Department …
Accepted
RONA-23 — Inform structural engineers about progressive collapse risk in system-built blocks
Recommendation: The structural engineers concerned with the development of system-built blocks should be made aware of the problem of progressive collapse {paragraph 183}.
Unknown
RONA-26 — Design system-built blocks to prevent susceptibility to progressive collapse
Recommendation: The design of system-built blocks should be such that they are not susceptible to progressive collapse {paragraph 190}.
Unknown
SHI-2 — Risk assessment on funding model changes
Recommendation: Accordingly, in situations where the funding model or procurement route changes mid project, a risk assessment should be conducted to assess whether work done on the project up to that point is suitable for the revised project. The rationale for …
Gov response: All 11 recommendations accepted by Cabinet Secretary Neil Gray MSP on 13 March 2025. Progress update 17 September 2025: The procuring NHS body will assess whether work done on the project up to that point …
Accepted
In progress
SHI-3 — Clarity in brief for healthcare facility construction
Recommendation: It is critical that a health board formulates and then presents its requirements for the key building systems in a proposed healthcare facility (its "brief") in terms which are full, clear, and unambiguous, and that that brief is finalised before …
Gov response: All 11 recommendations accepted by Cabinet Secretary Neil Gray MSP on 13 March 2025. Progress update 17 September 2025: The Scottish Government will adjust its procurement process to accommodate a gateway meeting prior to Financial …
Accepted
In progress
R5 — Hospital future uncertainty resolution
Recommendation: Scottish Government should ensure that where any uncertainty over the future of any hospital or service exists, resolution of the uncertainty is not delayed any longer than is essential.
Gov response: Section 2.1 of the Scottish Government's response outlines broader health policy initiatives, including the 2020 Vision and the integration of health and social care, which aim to improve care and ensure efficient resource use. It …
Accepted
PFD Reports (2)
Catherine Moore
Concerns: The MOD's vehicle maintenance system (JAMES) is complex, lacks audit capabilities, and has no formal processes for inspecting, testing, or providing feedback on repairs, risking vehicle safety.
Overdue
David Carpenter
Concerns: Widespread bin lorries contain significant design flaws, particularly in the automatic bin lift system, creating a foreseeable risk of workers being inadvertently lifted into the hopper and causing death, with slow and optional safety updates.
Responded