Undersea cables

National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) Open Inquiry
Opened: 23 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Undersea cables form the backbone of the world’s internet. The UK has around 60 cables which connect us to the outside world, carrying 99% of our data. Concern has been growing about the risk of these cables being sabotaged by foreign states. The consequences would be extensive. This inquiry will … Read more
21 Recommendations
7 Conclusions
1 Report
4 Oral sessions
2 Letters
4 Events
Activity timeline 8 events
18 Dec
2025
Report published
19 Sep
2025
Report published
8 Sep
2025
Correspondence
14 Jul
2025
Correspondence
30 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
9 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
19 May
2025
Oral evidence
12 May
2025
Oral evidence
Oral evidence sessions 4 sessions
30 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 4th session - ministerial
Kevin Adams · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology Luke Pollard MP · Ministry of Defence Paul Wyatt · Ministry of Defence Sir Chris Bryant MP · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
9 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 3rd session
Alasdair Wilkie · Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA) Alex Towers · BT Group Chief Constable Gavin Stephens · National Police Chiefs' Council Dr Fenella Wrigley MBE · London Ambulance Service John Wrottesley · European Subsea Cables Association Laura Catterick · UK Finance Mick McGovern · Alcatel Submarine Networks
19 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 2nd session
Captain Niels Markussen · NATO Commodore (Rtd) John Aitken OBE · Thales Dr Marie Jacobsson · Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Professor Aurel Sari · University of Exeter
12 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 1st session
Dr Sidharth Kaushal · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Elisabeth Braw · Atlantic Council Matthew Bowden · Red Penguin Marine Professor Kevin Rowlands · Kings College London
Title HC No. Published Items Response
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience and cr… HC 723 19 Sep 2025 28 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
6 results
Clear
2 Recommendation Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the...
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees to strengthen security, with DSIT writing to operators to request emergency 'good enough' repair plans within 12 months and defining standards. They are also reviewing legislation and will explore similar exercises with European counterparts.
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3 Conclusion Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks...
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the underlying sentiment, committing to ensuring subsea cable infrastructure is geographically diverse and working with industry and Crown Estates to secure space for future routes to support long-term resilience.
Cabinet Office
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4 Recommendation Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage...
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities Read more
Government Response
The government agrees to develop more detailed technical plans for managing cable systems, engage with operators, conduct sector-specific technical impact assessments, and use these findings to inform additional contingency plans and the National Emergency Plans framework for Subsea Cables.
Cabinet Office
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7 Recommendation Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage...
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49) Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the recommendation and will accelerate work with Lead Government Departments on technical impact assessments to help critical sectors prepare for subsea cable disruption, with oversight from the Cabinet Office’s ‘Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board’.
Cabinet Office
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17 Recommendation Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak.
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of … Read more
Government Response
The government accepts the recommendation, agreeing that current legislation for non-foreign power sabotage of cables is weak. It is conducting a comprehensive review of legislation related to subsea cable infrastructure to ensure robust routes for prosecuting private actors.
Cabinet Office
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21 Recommendation Accepted
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring...
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees to support the subsea cable industry in rolling out monitoring technology and is already engaged in cross-government cooperation, including commercial relationships and partnerships with the Royal Navy. It will explore better use of existing data, including AIS, and is collaborating across departments to ensure monitoring does not compromise defence or safety, while also considering new legislation.
Cabinet Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 28 of 21 classified
Accepted 6
Accepted in Part 7
Acknowledged 1
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 9
Rejected 1
Total 21 recs + 7 conclusions
Correspondence 2 letters
8 Sep 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology regarding the oral evidence held on 14 July concerning the Undersea cables inquiry, dated 15 August 2025
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14 Jul 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology following oral evidence held on 30 June on Undersea cables, dated 10 July 2025
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