The government partially agrees on the importance of a centralised coordination function, establishing an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board chaired by the Cabinet Office for strategic direction, but does not adopt the specific suggestion to expand SIRG or set up a new inter-ministerial group.

The government states it frequently uses diplomatic levers to ensure investigations into cable breaks. It notes existing IMO work on data sharing and mechanisms for reporting vessel behaviour, but states there is a limit to the utility of port inspections as suspicious vessels often avoid such ports.

The government partially agrees, stating deterrence concepts are under constant review and leveraging NATO. They acknowledge the importance of effective data sharing, which remains a firm requirement in existing programmes, but do not commit to designing new schemes with NATO for speedy data sharing.

The government partially agreed with the Committee's concerns, stating it is investing in new capabilities such as underwater drones, autonomous sensors, and new ships under the 'Atlantic Bastion' concept to augment the Royal Navy's ability to protect vulnerable cable regions. It also noted existing routine escorting exercises are conducted and reviewed.

The government partially agrees, stating escorting ships is an important task and rules of engagement are routinely reviewed. They are investing in new capabilities like underwater drones and the ‘Atlantic Bastion’ concept. They also state the Royal Navy already conducts routine live escorting exercises, which are frequently reviewed, but do not explicitly commit to new plans with international partners or a low threshold for physical interdiction.

The government partially agreed, acknowledging the need for improved coordination but declining to expand the SIRG. Instead, it stated that it has established an Undersea Infrastructure Security (UIS) Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, to provide a senior-level, cross-government function for strategic direction and coordination.

The government partially agrees, accepting the importance of a centralised function but rejecting the upgrade of SIRG and a new inter-ministerial group. They state an Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board has been established to provide a joined-up function and ministerial oversight is already provided by the National Security Council.