Undersea cables

National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) Open Inquiry
Opened: 23 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Undersea cables form the backbone of the world’s internet. The UK has around 60 cables which connect us to the outside world, carrying 99% of our data. Concern has been growing about the risk of these cables being sabotaged by foreign states. The consequences would be extensive. This inquiry will … Read more
21 Recommendations
7 Conclusions
1 Report
4 Oral sessions
2 Letters
4 Events
Activity timeline 8 events
18 Dec
2025
Report published
19 Sep
2025
Report published
8 Sep
2025
Correspondence
14 Jul
2025
Correspondence
30 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
9 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
19 May
2025
Oral evidence
12 May
2025
Oral evidence
Oral evidence sessions 4 sessions
30 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 4th session - ministerial
Kevin Adams · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology Luke Pollard MP · Ministry of Defence Paul Wyatt · Ministry of Defence Sir Chris Bryant MP · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
9 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 3rd session
Alasdair Wilkie · Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA) Alex Towers · BT Group Chief Constable Gavin Stephens · National Police Chiefs' Council Dr Fenella Wrigley MBE · London Ambulance Service John Wrottesley · European Subsea Cables Association Laura Catterick · UK Finance Mick McGovern · Alcatel Submarine Networks
19 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 2nd session
Captain Niels Markussen · NATO Commodore (Rtd) John Aitken OBE · Thales Dr Marie Jacobsson · Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Professor Aurel Sari · University of Exeter
12 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 1st session
Dr Sidharth Kaushal · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Elisabeth Braw · Atlantic Council Matthew Bowden · Red Penguin Marine Professor Kevin Rowlands · Kings College London
Title HC No. Published Items Response
1st Report - Subsea telecommunications cables: resilience and cr… HC 723 19 Sep 2025 28 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
9 results
Clear
5 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack.
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack. The Government and operators must take the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously, including against targets in Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Government Response
The government's response discusses the need for a UK-based and UK-flagged repair ship, which does not address the committee's recommendation about the vulnerability of cable landing stations or taking the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously.
Cabinet Office
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8 Conclusion Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’.
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’. This pays insufficient attention to the network’s actual capacity to absorb shocks and does not account for onshore vulnerabilities and long-term trends towards a more brittle system. There … Read more
Government Response
The government's response addresses emergency services' business continuity plans and their reliance on foreign internet servers, which does not engage with the committee's conclusion about the government's overall resilience concept regarding network capacity, shocks, and onshore vulnerabilities.
Cabinet Office
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9 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available...
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the National Security Act 2023 and reviewing legislation related to subsea cable sabotage, which does not address the recommendation about focusing on cable system capacity, rerouting data, or developing contingency plans for the Channel Tunnel.
Cabinet Office
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10 Conclusion Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is...
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is ageing, and erstwhile UK businesses have been acquired by foreign entities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Government Response
The government's response discusses UNCLOS and legal aspects of countering suspicious vessels, explicitly stating it does not accept reliance on piracy provisions or publishing a legal opinion, thereby failing to address the concern about access to cable repair vessels.
Cabinet Office
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11 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030.
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. This could be leased to industry on favourable terms during peacetime and made available for Government use in a crisis. The Government should set out a timetable for … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses existing international cooperation on cable breaks and vessel behaviour but does not address the recommendation to acquire a sovereign cable repair ship by 2030 or set a timetable for it.
Cabinet Office
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12 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable...
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills on commercial repair vessels. These could be called on in periods of heightened tension. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Moderate and catastrophic impacts Read more
Government Response
The government states it agrees with the recommendation, but the subsequent text discusses sensor and monitoring technologies and their integration with the Royal Navy, completely failing to address the call for training personnel in cable repair skills.
Cabinet Office
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13 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables.
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables. These should be a key focus for contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)
Government Response
The government partially agrees but primarily discusses military deterrence, reviewing concepts, and leveraging alliances, without detailing how specific vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector, and military communications cables will be a key focus for contingency planning.
Cabinet Office
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14 Conclusion Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly...
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly highly damaging. We estimate they would include payment and supply chain failures, some degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues—all at a time … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses escorting ships, investing in underwater drones, and the Royal Navy's exercises, which does not address the committee's conclusion regarding the impacts of catastrophic disruption or the adequacy of sector-by-sector assessments of reliance on subsea cables.
Cabinet Office
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16 Recommendation Not Addressed
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on...
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses exploring cable protection zones and engaging with European partners on maritime infrastructure protection, which does not address the recommendation regarding emergency services' business continuity plans for reliance on foreign internet servers or internet disruption.
Cabinet Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 28 of 21 classified
Accepted 6
Accepted in Part 7
Acknowledged 1
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 9
Rejected 1
Total 21 recs + 7 conclusions
Correspondence 2 letters
8 Sep 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology regarding the oral evidence held on 14 July concerning the Undersea cables inquiry, dated 15 August 2025
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14 Jul 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology following oral evidence held on 30 June on Undersea cables, dated 10 July 2025
Parliament page