Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Foreign Affairs Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 15 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are increasingly weaponised by hostile state and non-state actors and this inquiry will seek to understand which actors are primarily responsible, and which channels and technologies are being used. It will seek to map motivations, sources and locations of the most pressing disinformation threats to democracy, … Read more
33 Recommendations
22 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
11 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 20 events
9 Mar
2026
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
Ali Law · TikTok David Agranovich · Meta Wifredo Fernández · X Corp.
Ana Revenco · Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation Ciaran Martin CB · National Cyber Security Centre Vijay Rangarajan CMG · Electoral Commission
Jonny Hall CMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Stephen Doughty MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Alexandre Brasil · Brazilian Embassy in London Jon Bateman · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nina Jankowicz · American Sunlight Project Nishant Lalwani · International Fund for Public Interest Media Roberta Braga · Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas
Dr Antonio Giustozzi · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Dr Dani Madrid-Morales · The University of Sheffield Grace Theodoulou · The Council on Geostrategy James Kynge · Chatham House Mr Andrew Yeh · China Strategic Risks Institute
Salome Zourabichvili
Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr Jon Roozenbeek · King's College London Professor Martin Innes · Cardiff University Professor Vera Tolz-Zilitinkevic · University of Manchester
Recommendations & Conclusions
3 results
50 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on...
By design, malign actors conduct foreign interference in a covert and obfuscating manner, including on social media platforms. We are concerned that the National Security Act 2023 foreign interference offence, which is critical in combatting malign activity online, is limited … Read more
Government Response
The government disagrees, stating the National Security Act 2023 is carefully designed and needs time to be robustly tested. They note a live case may clarify its operation and will review legislation, working with Ofcom on platform duties under the Online Safety Act.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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51 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference...
The Government should conduct an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, a priority offence under the Online Safety Act 2023, to ensure it is fit for purpose given the difficulties in meeting the foreign power … Read more
Government Response
The government disagrees with conducting an urgent review of the National Security Act 2023 Foreign Interference Offence, stating the Act is new and has not been robustly tested, with a live case expected to clarify its operation.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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53 Recommendation Rejected
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide...
The Government should amend the Online Safety Act to oblige social media companies to provide transparency of user location. This should include publicly available information about 1) the region an account was created; 2) the region the account is based; … Read more
Government Response
The government explicitly disagrees with amending the Online Safety Act, citing legitimate reasons for VPN use and confidence that the current Act effectively addresses online harms, including those associated with transnational repression. It will continue to monitor the Act's effectiveness.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 55 of 33 classified

Total 33 recs + 22 conclusions
Correspondence 11 letters
25 Feb 2026 Correspondence with Ofcom relating to disinformation, dated 17 February and 03 February 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 30 and 14 January 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence from the Director of UK Public Policy at Meta relating to disinformation, dated 16 January 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Government Affairs Department at X relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 28 and 14 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy, MHCLG, relating to disinformation, dated 22 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Security, Home Office, and Minister of State, Cabinet Office, relating to disinformation, dated 26 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for AI and Online Safety, DSIT, relating to disinformation, dated 16 January and 07 January
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20 Jan 2026 Correspondence from Minister Doughty following up on the oral evidence session on 06 January, dated 19 January
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy (UK) at Meta, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Head of Government Affairs (UK and Ireland) at X, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January
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