Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Foreign Affairs Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 15 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are increasingly weaponised by hostile state and non-state actors and this inquiry will seek to understand which actors are primarily responsible, and which channels and technologies are being used. It will seek to map motivations, sources and locations of the most pressing disinformation threats to democracy, … Read more
33 Recommendations
22 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
11 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 20 events
9 Mar
2026
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
Ali Law · TikTok David Agranovich · Meta Wifredo Fernández · X Corp.
Ana Revenco · Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation Ciaran Martin CB · National Cyber Security Centre Vijay Rangarajan CMG · Electoral Commission
Jonny Hall CMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Stephen Doughty MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
Alexandre Brasil · Brazilian Embassy in London Jon Bateman · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nina Jankowicz · American Sunlight Project Nishant Lalwani · International Fund for Public Interest Media Roberta Braga · Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas
Dr Antonio Giustozzi · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Dr Dani Madrid-Morales · The University of Sheffield Grace Theodoulou · The Council on Geostrategy James Kynge · Chatham House Mr Andrew Yeh · China Strategic Risks Institute
Salome Zourabichvili
Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr Jon Roozenbeek · King's College London Professor Martin Innes · Cardiff University Professor Vera Tolz-Zilitinkevic · University of Manchester
Recommendations & Conclusions
8 results
1 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic...
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity. Russia’s behaviour is that of a … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the threat of Russian FIMI and details specific investments and support provided to countries in the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Armenia. This support includes strengthening civil society, independent media, cyber resilience, and media literacy to harden information ecosystems against Russian interference, with a commitment to continue these efforts.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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7 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three...
We welcome the Government’s actions to sanction the Russian information agency Africa Initiative and three of its leaders in July 2025, mirroring those implemented by the European Union in December 2024. (Conclusion, Paragraph 55)
Government Response
The government acknowledges the conclusion and provides further detail on its ongoing support for Moldova against Russian hybrid threats, including imposing sanctions on related networks and establishing a UK-Moldova Defence and Security Partnership.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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17 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking...
The Western Balkans and Armenia face a range of foreign information and manipulation challenges seeking to distort public opinion, promote authoritarian alternatives, and destabilise its democracies. Stability in the Western Balkans is vital for European security and NATO cohesion, while … Read more
Government Response
The government describes ongoing actions to address hybrid threats and FIMI, including increased coordination with the EU and member states through the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, with consultations focusing on the Western Balkans. It commits to continuing this collaboration and joint action with European partners.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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36 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with...
Tackling the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference requires dedicated and long-standing cooperation with allies. Whilst we welcome the Government’s increased engagement with EU partners, there is a need to move faster and significantly increase coordination to deter malign … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees, detailing recent increases in coordination with the EU and member states through consultations and bilateral agreements, and stating its intention to continue strengthening collaboration and joint action, including information sharing and coordinating sanctions.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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37 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on...
The Government should initiate the first UK-EU dialogue under the Security and Defence Partnership on foreign information manipulation and interference. The Government should also outline how it is using the Security and Defence Partnership and other bilateral agreements with EU … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and confirms it has already initiated UK-EU consultations on hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), under the Security and Defence Partnership, and will continue to strengthen collaboration through information sharing, analysis, and coordinated sanctions.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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40 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and...
The UK’s overseas diplomatic presence is vital to understanding and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We are concerned that at present the Government is not adequately utilising the expertise and evidence collated by its overseas network to inform its … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the conclusion, stating that the FCDO is investing in staff training for FIMI, leveraging its overseas network of political officers for intelligence gathering and collaboration, and deepening dialogue with international partners.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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41 Recommendation Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how...
The Government should in response to this report provide evidence to the Committee on how it utilises its overseas network to detect, defend and deter foreign information manipulation and interference and how these insights are informing policy responses. (Recommendation, Paragraph … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and states the FCDO is investing in staff upskilling, leveraging its network of political officers, and using reporting from overseas missions to build a global picture of the threat which informs policy responses.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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44 Conclusion Accepted
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat...
We are concerned that the government is in part restricting public awareness regarding the threat of foreign information manipulation and interference due to an unwillingness to declassify intelligence. It is the Committee’s opinion that there is a culture of secrecy … Read more
Government Response
The government partially agrees with the concern, highlighting its track record of publicly exposing foreign information manipulation and interference actors and committing to continue enhancing information sharing and stakeholder engagement while protecting sensitive intelligence.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 55 of 33 classified

Total 33 recs + 22 conclusions
Correspondence 11 letters
25 Feb 2026 Correspondence with Ofcom relating to disinformation, dated 17 February and 03 February 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 30 and 14 January 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence from the Director of UK Public Policy at Meta relating to disinformation, dated 16 January 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Government Affairs Department at X relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 28 and 14 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy, MHCLG, relating to disinformation, dated 22 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Security, Home Office, and Minister of State, Cabinet Office, relating to disinformation, dated 26 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for AI and Online Safety, DSIT, relating to disinformation, dated 16 January and 07 January
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20 Jan 2026 Correspondence from Minister Doughty following up on the oral evidence session on 06 January, dated 19 January
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy (UK) at Meta, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Head of Government Affairs (UK and Ireland) at X, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January
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