Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Foreign Affairs Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 15 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Misinformation and disinformation campaigns are increasingly weaponised by hostile state and non-state actors and this inquiry will seek to understand which actors are primarily responsible, and which channels and technologies are being used. It will seek to map motivations, sources and locations of the most pressing disinformation threats to democracy, … Read more
33 Recommendations
22 Conclusions
1 Report
7 Oral sessions
11 Letters
7 Events
Activity timeline 20 events
8 Jun
2026
Report published
27 Mar
2026
Report published
9 Mar
2026
Oral evidence
25 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
3 Feb
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
28 Jan
2026
Correspondence
20 Jan
2026
Correspondence
14 Jan
2026
Correspondence
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
9 Mar 2026
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Ali Law · TikTok David Agranovich · Meta Wifredo Fernández · X Corp.
13 Jan 2026
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Ana Revenco · Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation Ciaran Martin CB · National Cyber Security Centre Vijay Rangarajan CMG · Electoral Commission
6 Jan 2026
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Jonny Hall CMG OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Stephen Doughty MP · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
18 Nov 2025
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Alexandre Brasil · Brazilian Embassy in London Jon Bateman · Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nina Jankowicz · American Sunlight Project Nishant Lalwani · International Fund for Public Interest Media Roberta Braga · Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas
16 Sep 2025
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Dr Antonio Giustozzi · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Dr Dani Madrid-Morales · The University of Sheffield Grace Theodoulou · The Council on Geostrategy James Kynge · Chatham House Mr Andrew Yeh · China Strategic Risks Institute
1 Apr 2025
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Salome Zourabichvili
11 Feb 2025
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Foreign Affairs Committee
Dr Jon Roozenbeek · King's College London Professor Martin Innes · Cardiff University Professor Vera Tolz-Zilitinkevic · University of Manchester
Title HC No. Published Items Response
4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are see… HC 703 27 Mar 2026 55 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
21 results
Clear
2 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance...
The UK must prioritise existing funds for civil society organisations and independent media to enhance their resilience and capacity across Europe, but especially around the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans, to stem the flow of Russian influence and … Read more
Government Response
The government responds with general statements about national security, threats from China, and the Counter-Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, but does not address the recommendation to prioritize funds for civil society/media or step up counter-FIMI efforts in the Black Sea region and Western Balkans against Russian influence.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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3 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete,...
The Government has committed to a three C’s approach to bilateral relations with China: compete, cooperate and challenge. Whilst we of course recognise the need to engage with China, the second largest economy in the world, this cannot come at … Read more
Government Response
The government's response is entirely focused on its commitment to protecting the UK from hostile activity by Iran, including sanctions and the FCDO Iran Unit's expertise, and does not address the Committee's conclusion regarding the government's "three C's" approach to China.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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4 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state.
The Government must treat China the same as it treats any other state. It is therefore vital that the Government is transparent with Parliament and the public and outlines their strategy for engagement and the red lines for countering Chinese … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the CounterDaesh Communications Cell and its work against Daesh and al-Shabaab disinformation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding transparency on China's state influence and cyber-attacks.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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5 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and...
Prior to the joint US and Israeli attack, the Iranian regime presented a clear and persistent threat to those opposing its world view. This has manifested in support for armed groups and terrorist organisations, and the transnational repression of critics. … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on its ongoing commitment to support Ukraine against Russian information operations and disinformation through the UK-Ukraine 100 Year Partnership, and does not address the Committee's support for the specification of Iran under the National Security Act.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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6 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Hybrid Threats Directorate should draw upon capabilities within the Department’s Iranian regional teams to develop programming to counter foreign information manipulation interference campaigns emanating from Iran. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46) Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses entirely on its actions to counter Russian foreign information manipulation and interference in Georgia, including imposing sanctions, and does not address the recommendation to develop programming against Iranian FIMI.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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8 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by...
We are concerned that the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell, led by the UK, is not delivering as intended. Given the resurgence of Daesh in North Africa and the Middle East, it is imperative that tools to … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses countering information manipulation in Armenia and the Western Balkans, completely failing to address the committee's concerns about the effectiveness of the Global Coalition against Daesh’s Counter Daesh Communications Cell.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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9 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it...
The Government should review its work through the Counter Daesh Communications Cell to ensure it is producing messaging that appeals to potential recruits. It should also increase efforts to identify credible partners on the ground who are best placed to … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on media freedom in Africa, the Media Freedom Coalition, and sanctions against a Russian information operation, completely failing to address the recommendation regarding counter-Daesh communications and identifying partners.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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10 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase...
For over four years, Ukraine has continued to resist an imperialist Russia determined to erase its sovereignty and destabilise European security. We commend the bravery and sacrifice of the Ukrainian people as they fight not only for their own freedom … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses its concerns and actions regarding Chinese misinformation in Taiwan, and support for Taiwan's democratic processes, but does not address the Committee's commendation of UK support for Ukraine against Russian information warfare.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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11 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal...
For over a decade, Ukrainians have been resisting Russian information warfare and developing an arsenal of lessons learnt and best practices. It is therefore essential that Article 7 of the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement is seen as a … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the UK's partnership with the US and freedom of speech, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the UK-Ukraine One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement and its roadmap.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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14 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian...
We call on the Government to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials supporting the Foreign Agents Registration Act, Georgian kleptocrats and Georgian media organisation spreading disinformation. These additional designations would significantly increase the cost on … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses its longstanding commitment to protecting media freedoms and offers to provide verbal briefings, but it does not address the recommendation to implement new targeted financial and travel sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and other entities.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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15 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the...
Moldova, like Georgia, has faced concerted Russian interference in its politics, most visibly during the 2024 Presidential election and EU referendum and 2025 Parliamentary election. Yet on each occasion the Moldovan people have decisively rejected a turn toward Russia, choosing … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on BBC World Service funding and acknowledges a separate recommendation for additional funding, thereby not addressing the provided conclusion regarding Moldova's resilience and UK support.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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16 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to...
The UK Government must support Moldova in its investigations into those actors which sought to undermine electoral integrity through cyber-attacks, fake bomb threats at polling stations and foreign information manipulation 85 and interference campaigns. This includes the UK sanctioning individuals … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses the use of AI in information manipulation and its potential for countering FIMI, stating it will assess the utility of existing AI sandboxes and scope a bespoke AI counter disinformation sandbox, but does not address the recommendation to support Moldova's investigations or impose sanctions.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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19 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase...
The West is increasingly retreating from Africa as it reduces overseas development aid to increase domestic spending on defence. However, this withdrawal is enabling malign actors like Russia and China to fill the vacuum and increase their influence on political, … Read more
Government Response
The government's response details the FCDO's investment in FIMI training for staff in Africa and leveraging its diplomatic network to engage with host governments and civil society on FIMI threats, but it does not address the committee's observation regarding the West's alleged retreat from Africa or the impact of reduced overseas development aid.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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20 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid...
The Government should set out how it will ensure that reductions in overseas development aid and integrated security fund programming do not facilitate a vacuum that can be exploited by malign actors seeking advantage in Africa. We urge the Government … Read more
Government Response
The government's response details its commitment to increasing public awareness of foreign information manipulation and interference through publications and media literacy campaigns, but does not address the recommendation concerning reductions in aid programming or funding for independent media in Africa.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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21 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns...
Taiwan is under considerable pressure as China pursues targeted foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns to sway public opinion and change the terms of international diplomatic engagement. There are increasing concerns that increased hybrid attacks are setting the ground for … Read more
Government Response
The government shares the objective of improving FIMI awareness, highlights its track record of exposing and sanctioning FIMI actors (primarily Russia), and states it will continue to enhance information sharing and stakeholder engagement, but does not specifically acknowledge the Committee's observation regarding Chinese FIMI targeting Taiwan.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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22 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese...
The Government must use all its diplomatic powers, alongside that of allies to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan. The Government should expand its bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups to better understand the information environment within the … Read more
Government Response
The government's response focuses on general media literacy campaigns and engagement with social media platforms, but it does not address the specific recommendation to deter Chinese disinformation targeting Taiwan or expand bilateral relations with Taiwanese officials and civil society groups.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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23 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political...
The United States remains the UK’s closest security and defence partner, yet the evolving political landscape in Washington has introduced new strains in transatlantic cooperation on countering foreign information manipulation and interference. While both countries acknowledge the threat posed by … Read more
Government Response
The government's response addresses concerns about algorithms, the Online Safety Act, and a new Researcher Access to Data Scheme, but fails to engage with the committee's conclusion regarding the impact of the US political landscape on transatlantic cooperation and specific US actions.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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24 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States.
These tensions underscore the need for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States. Without such efforts, divergent approaches risk weakening collective work on combatting foreign information manipulation and interference. In principle, the government should stand up for those countering disinformation, … Read more
Government Response
The government describes its domestic legislative tools for countering foreign interference, such as the National Security Act 2023, but does not specifically address the recommendation for continued diplomatic dialogue with the United States or standing up for those countering disinformation globally.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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25 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional...
Latin America’s information environment is becoming increasingly contested, with foreign actors seeking to exploit regional divisions and anti-US sentiment. When combined with social media companies’ limited moderation capacity in Spanish and Portuguese, the risk of anti-democratic interference increases. (Conclusion, Paragraph … Read more
Government Response
The government's response discusses concerns about digital replicas and a forthcoming consultation on their potential harms, failing to address the committee's conclusion regarding the information environment in Latin America.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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26 Recommendation Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and...
The Government must work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media and strengthen cooperation with trusted civil society organisations recognising that instability in Latin America directly affects UK diplomatic, trade and security interests and should not be … Read more
Government Response
The government responds by discussing the Online Safety Act, VPN usage, and transnational repression, but does not address the recommendation to work with regional partners in Latin America to support independent media, strengthen FIMI monitoring capacity, or report on diplomatic engagement in the specified regions.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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27 Conclusion Not Addressed
4th Report - Disinformation diplom…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has acknowledged that its work on countering foreign information manipulation and interference has been limited to Europe due to funding constraints despite clear evidence that malign actors are exploiting weaker information environments in other … Read more
Government Response
The government's response outlines measures related to the Representation of the People Bill, a consultation on digital replicas, an AI labelling taskforce, and a ban on crypto asset donations, failing to address the conclusion regarding FCDO funding limitations or the strategic recognition of FIMI.
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
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Government Response AI assessment · 55 of 33 classified
Accepted 8
Accepted in Part 15
Acknowledged 4
Deferred 4
Not Addressed 21
Rejected 3
Total 33 recs + 22 conclusions
Correspondence 11 letters
25 Feb 2026 Correspondence with Ofcom relating to disinformation, dated 17 February and 03 February 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 30 and 14 January 2026
Parliament page
3 Feb 2026 Correspondence from the Director of UK Public Policy at Meta relating to disinformation, dated 16 January 2026
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3 Feb 2026 Correspondence with the Government Affairs Department at X relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 28 and 14 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Building Safety, Fire and Democracy, MHCLG, relating to disinformation, dated 22 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for Security, Home Office, and Minister of State, Cabinet Office, relating to disinformation, dated 26 and 07 January
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28 Jan 2026 Correspondence with the Minister for AI and Online Safety, DSIT, relating to disinformation, dated 16 January and 07 January
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20 Jan 2026 Correspondence from Minister Doughty following up on the oral evidence session on 06 January, dated 19 January
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy (UK) at Meta, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs at TikTok, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January.
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14 Jan 2026 From committee Letter to the Head of Government Affairs (UK and Ireland) at X, relating to the disinformation diplomacy inquiry, dated 14 January
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