8th Report - Northern Powerhouse Rail

There is a clear risk that the Department will not be able to manage the programme within its £45 billion funding cap. HM Treasury has set a £45 billion funding cap for the programme. This may help affordability, but we … Read more There is a clear risk that the Department will not be able to manage the programme within its £45 billion funding cap. HM Treasury has set a £45 billion funding cap for the programme. This may help affordability, but we are unclear how HM Treasury determined the cap before the entire 3 project is designed, scoped and costed. The final phase of Northern Powerhouse Rail—needed for the full connectivity and benefits—is at risk if the Department cannot scope the programme within the cap or if early cost estimates prove unrealistic. This serious risk is heightened by High Speed Two Limited’s (HS2 Ltd’s) responsibility for producing some of the cost estimates and the Department’s poor record on rail infrastructure costs and cost estimation. Yet the Department has no convincing plan for managing spending or prioritising benefits to remain within the cap. It also lacks a comprehensive approach to supporting local funding contributions and revenue-raising where local areas seek additional local benefits. We are concerned that areas less able to self-fund or attract private investment will be left behind and that the Department has not properly explored elements such as land value capture. recommendation a. The Department should set out how much funding it will allocate to each phase, and how it will support local government to raise additional funds. b. HM Treasury should explain in detail how it determined the £45 billion funding cap before the entire project is designed, scoped and costed. c. The Department should clearly set out how it will manage its spending within the £45 billion funding cap, including how it will control costs, prioritise benefits and decide what to descope if cost pressures emerge. d. Within six months, the Department should write to us to set out what it is doing to ensure HS2 Ltd’s plans and cost estimates for phase 2 are realistic. Show less

The Department has not yet put in place appropriate governance arrangements with other central government departments. Northern Powerhouse Rail requires input from and coordination with other central government departments like HM Treasury and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local … Read more The Department has not yet put in place appropriate governance arrangements with other central government departments. Northern Powerhouse Rail requires input from and coordination with other central government departments like HM Treasury and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) to ensure it enables the wider economic benefits intended for the North, such as urban regeneration and industrial growth. However, no formal governance is in place to bring the relevant central government departments together on joint decision-making. In 2025, the government announced changes to how it manages mega-projects to help remove obstacles to delivery for its largest and most complex projects. Northern Powerhouse Rail has all but one of the characteristics of a mega-project based on the Office of Value 4 for Money’s definition, but the government is not yet treating it as one. Whether it is formally a mega-project or not, the Department must ensure governance is as clear and effective as possible. recommendation a. Within six months, the Department should write to us to confirm whether Northern Powerhouse Rail is a mega-project or not. b. Within six months, the Department should write to us to explain how the governance arrangements in place are appropriate for the programme’s scale, longevity and dependence on other central government bodies for success. Show less

The Department’s arrangements for working with local government do not appear sufficient to manage the trade-offs it will need to make on funding and scope. The Department has agreements in place with individual local areas and is working with local … Read more The Department’s arrangements for working with local government do not appear sufficient to manage the trade-offs it will need to make on funding and scope. The Department has agreements in place with individual local areas and is working with local leaders in sub-regional groups to develop plans, build consensus and provide transparency on trade-offs and decisions. These groups do not make decisions on the programme, but they can make recommendations to Ministers. While HM Treasury is confident the arrangements are working well currently, we are concerned the system will not hold when it needs to make difficult trade-off decisions on scope and funding that affect different local areas disproportionately. For example, without the injection of sufficient local funds, an enhanced scope to increase local benefits in Manchester could be at the expense of benefits in another local area. Much appears to be resting on the Northern Growth Envoy’s ability to mediate between local areas and central government, but this is a new and untested role. recommendation The Department should set out the principles by which it will work with local government and confirm by when it will update us on the arrangements in place. Show less

The Department has not yet set out how Northern Powerhouse Rail will work alongside national and local transport plans and priorities. The government intends for Northern Powerhouse Rail to support future work to improve north-south connections on the West Coast … Read more The Department has not yet set out how Northern Powerhouse Rail will work alongside national and local transport plans and priorities. The government intends for Northern Powerhouse Rail to support future work to improve north-south connections on the West Coast Main Line into Manchester. We have previously heard this line will reach capacity by the 2030s, but the Department does not expect the relevant phase of Northern Powerhouse Rail to be complete until the mid-2040s. It is not clear how the Department plans to bridge this gap between the capacity requirements and the programme timelines. The Department must also ensure that local transport plans are well integrated across the Northern Powerhouse 5 Rail route as a whole – this will be key to a successful transport system for passengers. The Department is working individually with local areas to ensure Northern Powerhouse Rail joins up with local plans, but it is not clear how the Department is ensuring coherence across the whole route. recommendation The Department should clarify: a. how it will work with local areas to support the development of local transport networks across the route while ensuring they integrate with the Northern Powerhouse Rail plans; and b. how Northern Powerhouse Rail will help it meet the West Coast Main Line’s capacity requirements. Show less

We are not convinced that the Department has embedded all lessons from past failures into its management of the programme. We recognise that the Department has adapted its approach to Northern Powerhouse Rail in response to lessons from High Speed … Read more We are not convinced that the Department has embedded all lessons from past failures into its management of the programme. We recognise that the Department has adapted its approach to Northern Powerhouse Rail in response to lessons from High Speed Two (HS2) and other major rail programmes. It is also learning from the success of programmes like the Transpennine Route Upgrade. However, the Government Internal Audit Agency found that there is more work for the Department to do to embed lessons consistently across all its teams and programmes. The Northern Powerhouse Rail programme will span decades and cost tens of billions, so it is key that the lessons are embedded now and into the future. We also fear Northern Powerhouse Rail may face cost pressures from planning and biodiversity requirements – it is not clear how the government’s recent planning reforms will enable the Department to avoid the expensive measures needed on other projects, such as HS2’s costly bat tunnel. recommendation Within six months, the Department should set out: a. how it is ensuring lessons from other rail programmes are consistently shared and embedded into its management of Northern Powerhouse Rail; and b. how it will use recent planning reforms to reduce costs on Northern Powerhouse Rail; and c. how it will address the findings of the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA) that programme and project teams across the Department were not consistently applying the lessons the Department had identified. 6 1 Delivering benefits and learning lessons Introduction Show less

On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Transport (the Department), the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), and HM Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy.1

The Northern Growth Strategy sets out how the government expects providing better connections between northern city regions and towns through Northern Powerhouse Rail to support economic growth, for example by widening the pool of workers available to firms and the … Read more The Northern Growth Strategy sets out how the government expects providing better connections between northern city regions and towns through Northern Powerhouse Rail to support economic growth, for example by widening the pool of workers available to firms and the opportunities available to workers. It also sets out future areas of focus, such as urban 5 Committee of Public Accounts, Northern Powerhouse Rail written evidence 6 C&AG’s Report, paras 9 and 13-14 7 Qq 6 and 9 8 C&AG’s Report, para 14 9 Q 38 8 regeneration and industrial regeneration.10 However, the government has not yet set out how investment in these areas of focus will be prioritised to inform any potential trade-off decisions on Northern Powerhouse Rail.11 Managing spend within the funding cap Show less

HM Treasury has set a funding cap of £45 billion (2025 prices) on programme spend from 2026–27.12 The funding cap amount was based on factors including early estimated cost ranges based on potential scope options and assessment of long-term affordability, … Read more HM Treasury has set a funding cap of £45 billion (2025 prices) on programme spend from 2026–27.12 The funding cap amount was based on factors including early estimated cost ranges based on potential scope options and assessment of long-term affordability, and will be adjusted for inflation over time.13 The Department explained that it is a cap on the funding to be provided by central government rather than a cost estimate. It told us it now needs to develop a scope that can be delivered within this cap.14 In its written evidence to us, Transport for the North stated the funding cap should be used to focus informed decisions on what scope is affordable to achieve the outcomes, and to drive additional value from the spending.15 Show less

However, the Department has a track record of high infrastructure costs and poor cost estimation on its major rail projects. For example, in February 2025 we reported that the £45 billion budget for High Speed Two (HS2) Phase 1 was … Read more However, the Department has a track record of high infrastructure costs and poor cost estimation on its major rail projects. For example, in February 2025 we reported that the £45 billion budget for High Speed Two (HS2) Phase 1 was no longer viable given the cost estimates at the time, which were as high as £66 billion (all in 2019 prices).16 We asked the Department why it had appointed HS2 Ltd to develop plans for the predominantly new line from Liverpool to Manchester, given its track record of poor cost estimation. The Department explained that HS2 Ltd already held much of the expertise on that part of the line and the hybrid Bill process. It told us it had created a “ringfenced unit” within the company to deliver the Northern Powerhouse Rail work, with its own managing director and separate sub- committee to ensure oversight whilst minimising distractions from the HS2 Phase 1 reset.17 Show less

We asked the Department how it would ensure within-budget delivery for Northern Powerhouse Rail phases 1 and 2 so that there is funding left for the cross-Pennine improvements in phase 3. The Department replied that its approach was to not … Read more We asked the Department how it would ensure within-budget delivery for Northern Powerhouse Rail phases 1 and 2 so that there is funding left for the cross-Pennine improvements in phase 3. The Department replied that its approach was to not specify outputs but instead work with local leaders 10 HMG, Northern Growth Strategy: Case for Change, CP 1549, 14 January 2026 11 C&AG’s Report, para 10 12 C&AG’s Report, para 1.14; HMG, Northern Growth Strategy: Case for Change, CP 1549, 14 January 2026 13 C&AG’s Report, paras 13, 1.14 and 2.13 14 Qq 9 and 49 15 Transport for the North (NPR0003) 16 Committee of Public Accounts, HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation, Tenth Report of Session 2024–25, HC 357, 28 February 2025 17 Qq 43-44 9 on the outcomes to be delivered within the cap and therefore the scope decisions to be made. It also explained that its phased approach should provide a consistent pipeline of work for the supply chain, thus minimising construction costs. However, the witnesses did not set out a plan for cost management or explain how they would make trade-off decisions to remain within the cap.18 Show less

The Department told us that local places could also top up the funding from central government.19 We asked how the Department was supporting local funding contributions and ensuring areas less able to mobilise funds are not left behind. The Department … Read more The Department told us that local places could also top up the funding from central government.19 We asked how the Department was supporting local funding contributions and ensuring areas less able to mobilise funds are not left behind. The Department did not set out a clear approach, but explained that local funding could come from existing funding streams as well as potential future ones, subject to the Chancellor’s decisions on fiscal devolution.20 HM Treasury set out two of the Chancellor’s principles for fiscal devolution: fiscal neutrality (redirecting existing national taxation revenue streams to local areas, rather than generating new revenue) and fairness (making sure strong areas do not get stronger at the expense of weaker areas).21 When we asked how the Department intended to capture land value through planning gain, it explained that if mayoral authorities could capture planning gain then they could use this to top up the £45 billion, but gave no clear objective or central strategy on the matter.22 Learning lessons Show less

The NAO found the Department had established appropriate steps to identify lessons from other major programmes, but that it needed to go further to embed these in Northern Powerhouse Rail.23 In oral evidence, the Department was clear on the importance … Read more The NAO found the Department had established appropriate steps to identify lessons from other major programmes, but that it needed to go further to embed these in Northern Powerhouse Rail.23 In oral evidence, the Department was clear on the importance of learning from past failures, such as on HS2. It identified some examples of how it had changed its approach in response to the lessons, such as not determining the delivery model too fast, taking time to get the scoping and design right before starting construction, and not specifying cost estimates too early. The Department reported it was applying a structured set of lessons from HS2, Crossrail and other major infrastructure projects. It also explained it was learning positive lessons from the successes of the Transpennine Route Upgrade programme, which it said was on track to deliver early passenger benefits.24 18 Qq 18-19 and 49 19 Q 9 20 Qq 29-30 and 63 21 Q 30 22 Qq 60–63 23 C&AG’s report, para 16 24 Qq 3, 9 and 66 10 Show less

However, a Department-wide review by the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA) in January 2026 found that programme and project teams across the Department were not consistently applying lessons they had identified.25 We asked the Department how it was responding to … Read more However, a Department-wide review by the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA) in January 2026 found that programme and project teams across the Department were not consistently applying lessons they had identified.25 We asked the Department how it was responding to the finding. It told us the review found clear and well-designed lessons learned frameworks, but that consistent application of lessons was most challenging on smaller programmes with less dedicated resource. The Department confirmed it was the Permanent Secretary’s responsibility to ensure this consistency across all programmes, and the Northern Powerhouse Rail Senior Responsible Owner’s responsibility to ensure lessons were applied on the programme. It also told us the GIAA was reasonably positive about Northern Powerhouse Rail’s approach to learning and applying lessons, and that it had “the right basics in place” for turning “a very long set of lessons from multiple programmes over multiple decades into a clear action plan”.26 Show less

In February 2025, we reported that HS2 Ltd’s efforts to reduce the environmental impact of HS2 were not delivering value for money. For example, it was building a 1km ‘bat tunnel’ at a cost of around £100 million to reduce … Read more In February 2025, we reported that HS2 Ltd’s efforts to reduce the environmental impact of HS2 were not delivering value for money. For example, it was building a 1km ‘bat tunnel’ at a cost of around £100 million to reduce the impact of the railway on a protected species of bat.27 We asked about the impact of the Nature Restoration Fund on the Department’s large infrastructure projects, and whether this would enable Northern Powerhouse Rail to avoid such expensive measures to meet biodiversity requirements. The Department explained it was working with Defra to take advantage of the new Planning and Infrastructure Act. It identified two different areas of opportunity: more efficient consenting processes and more strategic approaches to nature recovery through environmental delivery plans and the Nature Restoration Fund. The Department was hopeful the changes would enable more balanced decisions supporting both nature recovery and efficient infrastructure delivery.28 However, in subsequent correspondence, the Department explained that the Nature Restoration Fund and its supporting measures were not yet live. As such the Department could not set out detail on how they would work in practice.29 25 C&AG’s report, para 16 26 Q 68 27 Committee of Public Accounts, HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation, Tenth Report of Session 2024–25, HC 357, 28 February 2025 28 Qq 70–72 29 Letter from the DfT, 14 May 2026 11 2 Working with central and local government Working with other central government departments Show less

While the Department for Transport is responsible for delivering the railway, it will need others in central government to conduct supporting activities to deliver the intended wider economic benefits.30 The Department told us that “it absolutely relies on the partnership … Read more While the Department for Transport is responsible for delivering the railway, it will need others in central government to conduct supporting activities to deliver the intended wider economic benefits.30 The Department told us that “it absolutely relies on the partnership [ … ] with MHCLG”.31 When we asked who would make trade-off decisions, for example about which mayoral combined authority would get extra benefits, the Department told us that “ultimately, decisions are made in the Treasury [ … ] about the relative allocation to transport [ … ] and therefore these sorts of enhancement programmes”.32 Yet the NAO found that the Department had no formal governance in place to bring the relevant central government departments together on joint-decision making, and that as of March 2026 the Department was considering potential arrangements.33 Show less

In 2025, the Office of Value for Money set out its definition for mega- projects—the government’s largest and most complex projects—and the government announced changes to how it manages mega-projects to help remove obstacles to delivery.34 The NAO found that … Read more In 2025, the Office of Value for Money set out its definition for mega- projects—the government’s largest and most complex projects—and the government announced changes to how it manages mega-projects to help remove obstacles to delivery.34 The NAO found that Northern Powerhouse Rail has five of the six mega-project characteristics. These include: • having cross-cutting impacts that span multiple government departments; • delivery taking longer than 10 years and spanning multiple Parliaments; and • being very expensive, with whole life costs over £10 billion.35 30 C&AG’s Report, paras 11 and 2.7 31 Q 16 32 Q 26 33 C&AG’s Report, para 11 34 HMT, Value for Money study on the governance and budgeting arrangements for mega projects, 19 June 2025 35 C&AG’s Report, Figure 7 12 Show less

However, the NAO also set out that the government views Northern Powerhouse Rail as a programme of different projects rather than one single mega-project.36 In oral evidence, the Department told us Northern Powerhouse Rail was “in effect [ … ] … Read more However, the NAO also set out that the government views Northern Powerhouse Rail as a programme of different projects rather than one single mega-project.36 In oral evidence, the Department told us Northern Powerhouse Rail was “in effect [ … ] a mega-programme”.37 In written evidence, Transport for the North described the programme as a series of discrete investments, which would realise benefits “greater than the sum of its parts” when delivered as a co-ordinated programme.38 Show less

The Department told us it was discussing with HM Treasury whether Northern Powerhouse Rail would be designated a mega-project. It said its key concern was how to get the benefits of the mega-project governance reforms as well as the benefits … Read more The Department told us it was discussing with HM Treasury whether Northern Powerhouse Rail would be designated a mega-project. It said its key concern was how to get the benefits of the mega-project governance reforms as well as the benefits of organising the programme as phased projects. The Department told us it would ensure clear decision-making and partnership working with all parts of Government, regardless of whether Northern Powerhouse Rail gains formal mega-project designation or not.39 Working with local government Show less

The Department told us that the government would ultimately take final decisions on the programme, but that it was seeking to design a governance system and partnership with local leaders “such that—to every extent possible—we get to a consensus on … Read more The Department told us that the government would ultimately take final decisions on the programme, but that it was seeking to design a governance system and partnership with local leaders “such that—to every extent possible—we get to a consensus on the way ahead”. It told us it was working with mayoral authorities at three levels.40 Show less

At the local level, it has discussions with mayors and local councils about specific stations or corridors, integration with local transport and development plans, and local funding contributions.41 The NAO reported the Department has signed agreements with individual combined authorities … Read more At the local level, it has discussions with mayors and local councils about specific stations or corridors, integration with local transport and development plans, and local funding contributions.41 The NAO reported the Department has signed agreements with individual combined authorities setting out how they will collaborate, including on key decisions and funding mechanisms.42 Show less

The Department explained it was working with sub-regional groups to develop the railway plans for phases 1 and 2.43 The NAO reported these delivery boards—including the Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board and the White Rose Partnership—are attended by combined authority mayors and … Read more The Department explained it was working with sub-regional groups to develop the railway plans for phases 1 and 2.43 The NAO reported these delivery boards—including the Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board and the White Rose Partnership—are attended by combined authority mayors and ministers. They do not have a decision-making role but can make recommendations to Ministers.44 36 C&AG’s Report, para 2.7 37 Q 15 38 Transport for the North (NPR0003) 39 Qq 15-16 40 Q 26 41 Q 26 42 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9 43 Q 26 44 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9 13 Show less

At the programme-wide level, the Department described “unified discussions” with mayors and ministers, where the indicative allocations for each phase of the programme will be set.45 The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy, who had been in post since this new role … Read more At the programme-wide level, the Department described “unified discussions” with mayors and ministers, where the indicative allocations for each phase of the programme will be set.45 The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy, who had been in post since this new role was established in October 2025, told us he also co-chairs a chief executives group to “bring the whole thing together at an official level”.46 In its written evidence, Transport for the North highlighted the importance of pan-Northern views given the scale of the programme.47 Show less

We are concerned that this partnership-based system is not clear on responsibilities and may not be robust enough for difficult trade-off decisions between local areas.48 For example, an underground station at Manchester Piccadilly would enable more development opportunities above the … Read more We are concerned that this partnership-based system is not clear on responsibilities and may not be robust enough for difficult trade-off decisions between local areas.48 For example, an underground station at Manchester Piccadilly would enable more development opportunities above the station than alternatives at surface level, but is expected to be more costly and could therefore reduce the budget available for additional development in other localities.49 Show less

The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy acknowledged that “it is really hard to agree stuff across the north of England” and that “there are really difficult decisions still to come”.50 However, he said he was confident in the approach they were … Read more The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy acknowledged that “it is really hard to agree stuff across the north of England” and that “there are really difficult decisions still to come”.50 However, he said he was confident in the approach they were taking because they had already tested it through the work to agree the programme sequencing and overall approach with the mayors. He expected the approach would be helpful because it provides transparency to everyone about the consequences of decisions.51 This was supported by written evidence from the Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board, which highlighted the government’s commitment to joint working with mayoral combined authorities and “holistic cross-government approach” to programme governance. It said this indicated the programme was being set up for success.52 Working with national and local transport plans and priorities Show less

As part of its January 2026 announcements, the government committed to building a new line between Birmingham and Manchester to improve north-south connections and meet expected capacity requirements. To enable these improvements, the government confirmed Northern 45 Q 18 46 … Read more As part of its January 2026 announcements, the government committed to building a new line between Birmingham and Manchester to improve north-south connections and meet expected capacity requirements. To enable these improvements, the government confirmed Northern 45 Q 18 46 Qq 26 and 33 47 Transport for the North (NPR0003) 48 Qq 27-28 49 Q 28; C&AG’s Report, para 13 50 Qq 27-28 51 Qq 27-28 52 Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board and Partnership Board [NPR0005] 14 Powerhouse Rail would proceed with the former HS2 alignment into Manchester as part of its phase 2 improvements between Liverpool and Manchester.53 The Department expects phase 2 to be completed in the mid- 2040s.54 However, in February 2025 the Department told us it expected the West Coast Main Line to reach capacity by the late 2030s.55 In oral evidence, the Department said the Office of Rail and Road already viewed the West Coast Mainline as full and it was unable to add any further train paths.56 Show less

We highlighted this gap to the Department. It told us it was looking at a range of measures to boost capacity without new infrastructure, but did not provide further detail on the measures. It also explained there was significant uncertainty … Read more We highlighted this gap to the Department. It told us it was looking at a range of measures to boost capacity without new infrastructure, but did not provide further detail on the measures. It also explained there was significant uncertainty when projecting rail demand so far into the future and set out why it believed the phase 2 timeline was necessary. Reasons for this included the time required to get the design right and for processes such as the passage of the hybrid Bill and consenting, and ensuring a “reasonably even profile of work” for the supply chain.57 Show less

The Department was clear on the need for Northern Powerhouse Rail to integrate with local transport, stating that “maximising the benefits of major rail investment requires coherent local planning that joins up rail, regeneration and local transport [and] that is … Read more The Department was clear on the need for Northern Powerhouse Rail to integrate with local transport, stating that “maximising the benefits of major rail investment requires coherent local planning that joins up rail, regeneration and local transport [and] that is absolutely what we have been trying to do.”58 MHCLG also emphasized how it was seeking to align local and national alignment on economic growth. It told us: “we want to empower the mayors to deliver their own local growth plans, but we have a system set up to agree shared priorities with national Government to shape both sides’ agendas.”59 In their written evidence to us, Transport for the North and the Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board also highlighted the importance of Northern Powerhouse Rail’s integration with local transport networks, needs and investment plans to maximise the programme’s growth benefits and inform trade-offs.60 Greengauge 21 identified the importance of improving city region rail services to get the most economic benefit from the investment – it viewed city region ‘commutability’ as the priority area for economic growth.61 53 Q20; DfT, Northern Powerhouse Rail: Millington to Manchester alignment for the route between Liverpool and Manchester - accounting officer assessment summary, January 2026 54 C&AG’s Report, Figure 8 55 Committee of Public Accounts, HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation, Tenth Report of Session 2024–25, HC 357, 28 February 2025 56 Q 20 57 Qq 20-21, 31 and 65 58 Q 69 59 Q 55 60 Transport for the North [NPR0003]; Liverpool–Manchester Railway Board and Partnership Board [NPR0005] 61 Greengauge 21 [NPR0004] 15 Show less

We asked the Department how it was managing interdependencies with other transport plans and how it could ensure Northern Powerhouse Rail was integrated with local transport networks, if local transport decisions were left up to mayors. The Department told us … Read more We asked the Department how it was managing interdependencies with other transport plans and how it could ensure Northern Powerhouse Rail was integrated with local transport networks, if local transport decisions were left up to mayors. The Department told us it was working directly with individual local authorities and leaders on integration with local transport networks as well as local growth plans. It also highlighted the government’s Transport for City Regions funding of £15 billion over five years. It gave the example of Sheffield’s tram-train extension, for which the Department had provided additional capability and £7.5 million in funding to the South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority to develop the outline strategic case.62 Show less

The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy emphasised that their approach with local areas was about more than just transport and stations, but “placemaking”.63 MHCLG also set out that it was trialling ‘place-based business cases’, which consider how a set of interventions … Read more The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy emphasised that their approach with local areas was about more than just transport and stations, but “placemaking”.63 MHCLG also set out that it was trialling ‘place-based business cases’, which consider how a set of interventions come together in a given place. Liverpool is one of its pilot places, in which it told us that there is a “huge regeneration opportunity” around Liverpool Central train station including transport, housing, regeneration and public services.64 Show less

We asked how the programme’s strategic case would recognise the wider social benefits of investments, and how decisions would prioritise catalysing growth (such as in Bradford) rather than generating marginal gains in already strong economies (such as in Leeds and … Read more We asked how the programme’s strategic case would recognise the wider social benefits of investments, and how decisions would prioritise catalysing growth (such as in Bradford) rather than generating marginal gains in already strong economies (such as in Leeds and Manchester). The Treasury’s Northern Growth Envoy explained that the new Green Book approach would take into account the “transformational” effect of the rail improvements for Bradford’s residents, “particularly those young people who are looking for jobs”.65 62 Qq 35, 37 and 54-55 63 Q 11 64 Q 11 65 Qq 12-13 16 Show less