NS&I’s transformation programme

Public Accounts Committee Open Inquiry
Opened: 10 Jul 2025 Parliament page
National Savings and Investments (NS&I), which borrows on behalf of government from retail investors via products such as premium bonds, has around 25m savers with over £230bn invested. It is undertaking a business transformation programme to replace Atos as the single supplier of its back-office and customer-facing functions with a … Read more
5 Recommendations
24 Conclusions
1 Report
1 Oral session
7 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 11 events
7 Apr
2026
Report published
2 Mar
2026
Correspondence
13 Feb
2026
Report published
12 Feb
2026
Correspondence
19 Jan
2026
Correspondence
19 Jan
2026
Correspondence
19 Jan
2026
Correspondence
18 Dec
2025
Oral evidence
18 Dec
2025
Correspondence
18 Dec
2025
Formal meeting (oral evidence session) · The Grimond Room, Portcullis House
15 Dec
2025
Correspondence
Oral evidence sessions 1 session
18 Dec 2025
View on parliament.uk
Dax Harkins · National Savings and Investments James Bowler CB · HM Treasury Matthew Smith · National Savings and Investments Sam Beckett · Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Stephen Farrington · HM Treasury
Title HC No. Published Items Response
67th Report - NS&I’s transformation programme HC 1237 13 Feb 2026 29 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
29 results
2 Recommendation Accepted
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Seek positive attestation on NS&I implementing culture review recommendations and leadership learning lessons.
NS&I’s positive news culture has meant it has not learned lessons, which has affected its ability to deliver the programme. NS&I told us that that it promotes a “can do” attitude and culture; while this has benefits in encouraging commitment … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and commits to presenting an initial plan for business-wide cultural change, addressing review findings, to the Board/Treasury in early Summer 2026 for implementation over 12-18 months. It also notes ongoing governance revisions to incorporate feedback and challenge.
HM Treasury
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3 Recommendation Accepted
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Strengthen and embed NS&I's new risk management framework, reporting progress to the Committee.
It has taken NS&I far too long to develop a risk management framework, which has left the taxpayer exposed to unacceptable risks. NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel with no understanding of the risks … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with both recommendations, committing to Mr Goldstone reviewing the application of the new risk management framework and NS&I writing to the Committee by June 2026 on its progress in implementing and embedding the framework.
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4 Recommendation Accepted
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Write to the Committee detailing resource management strategy, consultant use, and supplier contract management.
NS&I has failed to support the Programme with the skills and expertise it needs to deliver successfully. As an organisation with most of its operations contracted out to Atos, it is not surprising that NS&I had limited experience of digital … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees and commits to NS&I setting out its resource management strategy, including consultant and supplier contract management, to the Committee within six months.
HM Treasury
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5 Recommendation Accepted
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Amend NS&I's reporting to include additional metrics on Programme cost and progress.
NS&I’s governance structures still do not have the performance metrics and information needed to hold the Programme to account. It is difficult to establish the cost of the Programme from the information provided by NS&I. The Treasury told us that, … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees, stating that NS&I has already implemented new monthly reporting metrics for delivery progress and spend, will complete a full spend audit by Q1 2026-27, and is working to enhance financial reporting across governance forums.
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6 Recommendation Accepted
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Report to Committee on Treasury's assessment of NS&I's plan, budget, and oversight lessons.
The programme had suffered several serious setbacks before the Treasury gave it the attention it deserved. While NS&I is responsible for the Programme, the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor department and, given its wider role in promoting good practice in managing … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees, stating the Treasury will assess NS&I's integrated plan through a new Full Business Case via the Treasury Approval Panel process, requiring external assurance and considering David Goldstone's advice. It also highlights actions already taken, such as bolstered Board representation and engaged skilled support, as examples of lessons learned from oversight.
HM Treasury
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1 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Evidence gathered from NS&I and Treasury on the Business Transformation Programme.
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from National Savings & Investments (NS&I) and from HM Treasury (the Treasury) on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme.1
Government Response
The government acknowledges the Committee's foundational conclusion and provides an update on NS&I's Business Transformation Programme, including plans for developing options for a revised Full Business Case by Q2 2026-27 and leadership changes to address operational failures.
HM Treasury
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7 Conclusion Not Addressed
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I attempted an overly complex, risky programme with too many parallel transitions.
We asked NS&I why it had been trying to do such a complex Programme, splitting operations undertaken by a single supplier into a multi-supplier model, in such a risky way. The NAO report shows that NS&I original planned expected four … Read more
Government Response
The government's response completely fails to address the committee's conclusion about NS&I's complex programme transition and the need for re-evaluation, instead discussing unrelated matters concerning Carer's Allowance overpayments and reassessments.
HM Treasury
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8 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I still lacks an agreed integrated plan, facing further programme delays.
In December 2025, after five years, NS&I still has no agreed and approved integrated plan to indicate a Programme end date and milestones. NS&I has repeatedly failed to deliver such a plan.12 At our session in December 2025, NS&I said … Read more
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9 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I unable to provide updated Programme costs, expecting to exceed available budget.
In the absence of a complete and approved integrated plan, NS&I was unable to provide us with an updated estimate of Programme costs. It had spent £111 million on the Programme by March 2024, but could not give us a … Read more
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10 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I confident in delivery despite lack of plan, failing to justify programme approach.
Despite the lack of information on timetable and cost, NS&I claimed it was confident that it could find a way to deliver the Programme by 2028, by “deprioritising” some aspects of the Programme.22 When asked how it could be confident … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the lack of information on timetable and cost and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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11 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I questions evidence-based decisions and deflects blame for Programme failures.
When we asked if decisions were being taken based on evidence, NS&I said that “there is always a chance that assumptions are incorrect”.26 The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority had found that NS&I’s understanding of the alternative approaches had … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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12 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I leadership slow to act on advice, offering limited lessons from Programme issues.
The external organisations that have reviewed the programme told the NAO that NS&I was sometimes or often slow to act, or did not act at all, on advice.29 We asked whether NS&I’s leadership had learned from the issues with the … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about NS&I's slowness to act on advice and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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13 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's "good news" culture fosters over-optimism and hinders Programme progress assessment.
We asked the chief executive if he was creating a ‘good news’ culture, which the NAO has identified as a factor in why programmes resets may not work, and which can lead to a situation where decisions are not made … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about a 'good news' culture and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
HM Treasury
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14 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I internal review found slow, hierarchical decision-making and lack of transparency.
The Government Internal Audit Agency’s review of NS&I’s culture in December 2024, found that staff felt decision-making was slow and hierarchical, decision-making processes were not understood, and there was a lack of transparency within Programme processes.36 NS&I introduced a leadership … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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15 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I launched risky parallel transitions lacking understanding and management of programme risks.
In taking forward the Programme, NS&I launched multiple procurements and planned to deliver four transitions in parallel, with no understanding of the risks that this was exposing the organisation and its customers to. NS&I said it had identified supply chain … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Programme's procurements and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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16 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's core banking engine replacement and data migration pose significant risks
There are still many risks for the Programme to manage, for example the replacement of the ‘core banking engine’ is extremely high risk, but the main work has yet to start.41 NS&I agreed that when it replaced its banking engine, … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risks to the Programme and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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17 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's new Risk Management Framework remains inadequately embedded and reliant on external expertise
In 2025, NS&I implemented a new Risk Management Framework, but has not yet fully embedded the framework throughout its organisation.43 We wanted assurance that this framework is good enough to ensure that risks to customer data could be managed, and … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about risk management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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18 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I faces significant recruitment challenges, relying heavily on consultants for technical skills
NS&I had most of its operations contracted out when starting the Programme, and it had limited capability to deliver a digital transformation.46 NS&I told us it has found it difficult to recruit the additional skills and capability the Programme needs. … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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19 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I admits significant skills gaps, particularly in systems integration, hindering programme delivery
We pushed NS&I to tell us if it now had the skills and capability it needed. NS&I acknowledged that it had needed to bring in more capability, including in systems integration and at senior levels.50 It also, eventually, recognised that … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about skills and capability and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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20 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's workforce plan lacks detail, with outdated cost estimates failing to reflect increased staffing
NS&I said it was now developing a plan for workforce management in a more structured way, but did not provide details.54 It had identified the need to transfer knowledge from consultants to permanent staff.55 Its recruitment 45 Q 63 46 … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about workforce management and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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21 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's continued reliance on distressed supplier Atos necessitates improved contract management practices
NS&I will continue to rely on Atos, which suffered financial distress in 2024, until at least 2028. NS&I told us it now has a contract management framework to manage Atos and the contracts with new suppliers. NS&I will need to … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge these concerns and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance. NS&I is working to develop a comprehensive integrated plan that includes clear timelines, cost estimates, and resource allocation.
HM Treasury
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22 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Treasury's 'earned autonomy model' for NS&I means intervention only occurs after issues emerge
NS&I has its own accounting officer and its own Board, and is responsible for the Programme, while the Treasury is NS&I’s sponsor in government and also has a role overseeing major programmes across government.64 The Treasury told us that it … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the Treasury's oversight role and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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23 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Treasury's intervention in NS&I's red-rated programme was significantly delayed despite early warnings
The NAO found that the Treasury has increased its scrutiny of the Programme since 2024, and had instigated changes to governance, including appointing new NEDs.66 The Treasury noted that it has now moved to a “quite interventionist” approach, but agreed … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about the timing of increased scrutiny of the Programme and commit to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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24 Conclusion Acknowledged
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's evolving governance structures lack clarity and substantive plans to prevent future issues
NS&I said its governance structures had evolved, and it would add more NEDs. It said these changes were improving delivery, but gave no substantive answer to how its governance would ensure problems did not happen again. It also acknowledged that … Read more
Government Response
The Treasury and NS&I acknowledge concerns about governance structures and are committed to addressing them through robust planning, risk management, and governance, including developing a comprehensive integrated plan and strengthening systems integration capabilities.
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25 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's programme cost data remains unclear, with financial controls rated only 'moderate
The NAO reported that it was challenging to establish the cost of the Programme from the information NS&I provided. NS&I said it was working on improvements to its cost data for its next business case this.72 The Treasury said it … Read more
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26 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's lack of transparency hinders Treasury's understanding of programme cost increases
The Treasury told us that the lack of transparency from NS&I had made it difficult for the Treasury to understand the reasons for the cost increases, saying it was not always clear whether the funding NS&I received was being used … Read more
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27 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
NS&I's corporate metrics inadequately measure programme progress despite significant business risks
NS&I’s annual report and accounts state that it is meeting its overarching corporate metrics, including the important measure of how much finance it raises for government. There are risks to NS&I’s whole business and to its customers if the Programme … Read more
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28 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Treasury lacked clarity on NS&I programme spending between business case approvals
The Treasury had applied its usual scrutiny to the Programme’s Outline Business Case in 2020 and Full Business Case in 2023, approving each subject to conditions.80 The Treasury said it had been satisfied by the spend data in the business … Read more
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29 Conclusion
67th Report - NS&I’s transformatio…
Programme budget fixed prematurely, requiring NS&I to develop plan within existing financial constraints
The Treasury said its spending review controls require the lead NED on the transformation committee to assure Ministers that the finances of the programme are under control.84, and it now seeks quarterly affirmation from NS&I NEDs on progress before releasing … Read more
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Government Response AI assessment · 22 of 5 classified
Accepted 5
Acknowledged 16
Not Addressed 1
Total 5 recs + 24 conclusions
Correspondence 7 letters
2 Mar 2026 To committee Letter from the Chief Executive of NS&I relating to the NS&I transformation programme, 26 February 2026
Parliament page
12 Feb 2026 From committee Letter to the Chief Executive of NS&I regarding Notification of two contingent liabilities – operational and fraud losses, 12 February 2026
Parliament page
19 Jan 2026 To committee Letter from the Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury relating to the Committee’s evidence session on 18 December 2025 on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme, 13 January 2026
Parliament page
19 Jan 2026 To committee Letter from the Chief Executive Officer at NS&I relating to the Committee’s evidence session on 18 December 2025 on NS&I’s Business Transformation Programme, 13 January 2026
Parliament page
19 Jan 2026 NS&I’s Risk Management Framework [this relates to the letter (no. 2) from NS&I’s Chief Executive Officer]
Parliament page
18 Dec 2025 To committee Letter from Chief Executive NS&I regarding NS&I Departmental Minute Laid-Notification of Two Contingent Liabilities, 17 December 2025
Parliament page
15 Dec 2025 To committee Letter from the Chief Executive of NS&I relating to the NS&I Business Transformation Programme, 05 December 2025
Parliament page